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Abstract
By casting into the indeterminatefuture and projecting visions of socalled killer robots, The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (The Campaign)
has incited moral panic in an attempt to stimulate a discussion-and
ultimately a ban-on lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS). The Campaign's
efforts have been superficially successful, but have come at a substantive
cost. In an effort to shift the circular dialogue toward constructive
discussions on the interaction between human and machine abilities in
weapon systems, this article explores the conceptualparadox implicit in The
Campaign.
The call for a ban provokes the international community to envision
future, dire harm from LAWS. It attempts to ban not only future 'fully
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autonomous" weapons systems, which do not (and may never) exist, but also
some unspecified portion of current weapons systems. The real concern is
the weapon systems' autonomy in certainfunctions-selecting and engaging
targets. However, weapons systems that perform these functions without
human intervention have been employed internationallysince 1980. Despite
its attempts tofoster panic, The Campaign is unable to speciy which current
system should be included in the ban. As a result, the LAWS debate remains
stagnant.
This article explains autonomy in general and as applied to weapons
systems. It examines The Campaign'sprimary source documents, reports on
LAWS by the Human Rights Watch and a United Nations Special
Rapporteur. After discussing the flaws with The Campaign's approach, this
articleproposes an alternativemoratorium on LAWS primarily designed to
lethally targetpersonnel.

2

False Rubicons

[Vol. 44: 1, 2016]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS
...................... ....................
.................................................
............................
......
A. Autonomous Weapons System Examples.....................
B. Untoward Outcomes.............................
C. Semi-Autonomous Weapons
...................

INTRODUCTION

I. AUTONOMY
II. LAWS..................

III.

CRITIQUING THE CAMPAIGN'S SOURCE DOCUMENTS: LOSING
HUMANITY & THE SR REPORT..........................

A. MoralPanic
1. Losing Humanity
2. SR Report

...................................
........................
.....
.................................

B. Conceptual Paradoxes

1. Losing Humanity

32

32
34
35

......................

39

......................

39

a. Automatic Weapon Defense Systems.............

41

......... 44

b. Lack ofFunctionalUtility...........
c. PracticalReasons......................

2. SR Report

44......
13
19
21
27
28

44

.................................

45

a. Time as a Measure ofAutonomy....................
48
b. Automatic v. Autonomous
.......
............. 49
C. FlawedProposals
............................... 51

1. Losing Humanity's Call for a Ban........................
2. SR Report's Call for a Moratorium

.......

51

......... 54

IV. CCW............................................

55

V. PROPOSAL
.................................................
59
A. PracticalAdvantages ofa Limited Moratorium
.
........... 60

1. Feasibility...........................
2. Consistency with CCW Regime..................
B. StrategicAdvantages of a Limited Moratorium

60
64
..

........... 66

1. Moratorium
...........................
..... 66
2. Modify the Optics ........................
66
3. Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement................. 67
CONCLUSION

..................................................

69

3

False Rubicons

[Vol. 44: 1, 2016]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

In 49 B.C., Julius Caesar halted his army on the banks of the
Rubicon River in northern Italy. According to Suetonius, he paused
in momentary hesitation, before sweeping across the waters toward
Rome with the immortal phrase Alae iacta est (The die has been
cast). By violating an ancient Roman law forbidding any general to
cross the Rubicon with an army, Caesar's decision made war

inevitable. Ever since, "crossing the Rubicon" has come to
symbolize a point of no return, when the time for deliberation is
over and action is at hand.'
According to an increasingly vocal chorus, the international community
of today is similarly poised on the banks of a new and different, but equally

emblematic, Rubicon. This contemporary point of no return is fraught with
unalterable consequences on the very "ability of the international legal
system to preserve a minimum world order."' This modem day Rubicon
takes the form of the international community's decision on whether to
develop and employ lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS)-the

hallmark of which is the capability to "select and engage targets without
further human intervention." 4

The chorus is orchestrated by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (The
Campaign), "a global coalition [comprised] of 61 international, regional, and
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 26 countries."'
Developed in 2012 and formally launched in 2013, The Campaign has

1. Dominic D.P. Johnson & Dominic Tierney, The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to
Conflict Reaches the Point ofNo Return, 36 INT'L SECURITY 7, 7 (2011) (citing C. Suetonius, LIVES
OF THE CAESARS, VOLUME 1: JULIUS, AUGUSTUS, TIBERIUS, GAIUS, CALIGULA (J.C. Rolfe trans.,
Harv. Univ. Press 1989)).
2. See infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
3. Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 110, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) [hereinafter SR
Report].
4. Id. at 1. But as this article discusses, how to define LAWS, when in the negotiating process
they should be defined, and even if a definition is feasible, are all unresolved and debated questions.
See discussion infra Part II.
5. See Who We Are, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/ (last

visited Oct. 6, 2016). Constituent parts of what would become The Campaign began efforts to raise
awareness in 2008. Chronology, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.
org/chronology/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
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lobbied the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional

Weapons (CCW) to adopt a protocol prohibiting LAWS.6 In essence, The
Campaign has called for the international community to collectively agree to
not cross the LAWS' Rubicon.

Principally underpinning The Campaign's clarion call are two sources: a
2012 report produced by Human Rights Watch and the International Human

Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School-Losing Humanity: The Case Against
Killer Robots (Losing Humanity),' which called for a ban on LAWS, and a
2013 report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial
summary or
moratorium.9

arbitrary

executions

(SR

Report), which

called

for a

6. Nations Agree to Take on Killer Robots!, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS,
http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2013/11/ccwmandate/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) [hereinafter
Nations Agree]. The CCW's full title is the "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects as amended on 21 December 2001" though it's commonly referred to as
CCW. See The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UNITED NATIONS OFF. GENEVA,

http://www.unog.chl80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4FODEF093B4860B4C1257180004BlB30?O
penDocument (last visited Oct. 25, 2016) [hereinafter CCW Website]. There are currently 121 states
parties to CCW, the purpose of which is "to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that
are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians

indiscriminately." Id.

There are five Protocols to the CCW: (I) non detectable fragments; (II)

mines, booby traps, and other devices; (III) incendiary weapons; (IV) blinding laser weapons, and

(V) explosive remnants of war. Id.
7. The Campaign calls for a "comprehensive, pre-emptive prohibition on the development,
production and use of fully autonomous weapons." The Solution, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER
ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/the-solution/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). At the same
time, The Campaign also calls on all countries to implement the SR Report's recommendation for a

moratorium on what it refers to as lethal autonomous robots (LARs). Id. But the lack of specificity
in how the SR Report defines LARs renders the subject of the proposed moratorium unclear. Id.
8. Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, HuM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arnsl 12ForUpload_0_0.pdf
[hereinafter
Losing
Humanity].
9. SR Report, supra note 3, 1 118.
In 2016, the Special Rapporteur issued a report
recommending that "[a]utonomous weapons systems that require no meaningful human control
should be prohibited." Maina Kiari (Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council) & Christof
Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Joint Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association and the
Special Rapporteuron Extrajudicial, Summary or ArbitraryExecutions on the ProperManagement
ofAssemblies, ¶ 67(f), U.N. Doc A/HRC/31/66 (Feb. 4, 2016). This article focuses on the Special
Rapporteur's 2013 Report, because it remains, along with Losing Humanity, one of the two source

documents that The Campaign contends explain the problem of killer robots.

The Problem,

CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/the-problem/ (last visited Oct.

6,2016).
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The implicit-if not explicit-message of both source documents is

similar, metaphorically anyway, to that associated with Caesar-to cross this
Rubicon, to develop LAWS,' 0 would lead to the most drastic of outcomes
from which there can be no turning back."

Losing Humanity warns that

developing LAWS will inevitably result in unsupervised killer robots, which
"could one day have the ability to make such choices under their own

power."1 2 And the SR Report cites LAWS as "tireless war machines," which
would act as a "form of mechanized pesticide," treating humans like
"vermin." 3
Comparing Caesar crossing the Rubicon with the international
community developing and employing LAWS is possible in part, because

both Losing Humanity and the SR Report reduce LAWS to a future, binary
decision.1 4 The international community will either cross the Rubicon and
develop LAWS, or it won't." And both source documents are steadfast in
the view that the international community must not cross.16
The similarities between the Rubicon and The Campaign's narrative are
intriguing, but in unexpected ways. In addition to a shared fondness for
evocative language, both are, if not false, then reliant on revisionist or
selective history. And fascinatingly, what's more likely to have actually
happened vis-A-vis Caesar and the Rubicon is an even more apt metaphor for

what is actually happening (and has happened) with LAWS; a reality quite
different than that portrayed by The Campaign.
Caesar is unlikely to have crossed the Rubicon in any way similar to the
stirring rendition so often described.1 7 He wasn't on horseback, pausing at
10. As discussed in this article, LAWS, Killer Robots, and LARs, while differing in significant
aspects of their meaning, all include weapons that can select and engage targets without further
human intervention. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Section III.C.
12. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 1.
13. SR Report, supra note 3, ¶¶ 95, 109. As discussed in this article, the issue of LAWS is not
lacking for hyperbole. See, e.g., Stuart Russell, Take a Stand on AI Weapons, 521 NATURE 415, 416
(2015), http://www.nature.com/news/robotics-ethics-of-artificial-intelligence-1.17611.
For one of
any number of examples, in 2015, a University of California computer science and engineering
professor (and former department chair) claimed that we "can expect [LAWS] deployed in the

millions, the agility and lethality of which will leave humans utterly defenceless." Id.
14. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8; SR Report, supra note 3; see also infra Sections III.B-C.
15. See infra Section III.C.
16. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8; SR Report, supra note 3.
17. Robert Morstein-Marx, J Reuben Clark III Lecture: Did Caesar Cross the Rubicon?, BYU
HUMAN. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://humanities.byu.edu/j-reuben-clark-iii-lecture-did-caesar-cross-the-
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the banks before leading the XIII Legion in fording the Rubicon during the
day.' 8 He was in a carriage, on a road, and crossed the river at night as part
of a thirty-mile journey.1 9 It's not even clear that Caesar's individual
crossing of the Rubicon constituted a violation of Roman law.2 0 Finally,

Caesar did not make dramatic pronouncements while crossing the river; if
anything, the die had already been cast.2 1

Before Caesar had even set out on his night's carriage ride, he had
already sent across the river a small body of men bearing arms
under civilian dress whose mission was to enter the city at night and

ensure it did not close its gates to their commander when he
- a22
2.
arrived

At the time, Caesar crossing the Rubicon was neither dramatic nor notable.
It only became so through subsequent creative license and language.2 3
Similarly, the decision to employ LAWS is not looming-the
international community crossed that Rubicon decades ago.24 Over thirty
countries have employed autonomous weapons systems of one type or
another and as far back as 1980.25

rubicon/ [hereinafter Morstein-Marx, Did Caesar Cross the Rubicon?]. Morstein-Marx, a classics
professor, contends that the historical account, recorded some twenty years after its purported

occurrence, is "dubious history," but that "[b]y having Caesar announce that he's fully and
counterfactually aware of the terrible consequences that will follow from his action" renders it
tragically poignant. Id.; see also Robert Morstein-Marx, Caesar'sAlleged FearofProsecution and
His "Ratio Absentis" in the Approach to the Civil War, 56 HISTORIA: ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ALTE
GESCHICHTE 159 (2007) [hereinafter Morstein-Marx, Caesar's Alleged Fear of Prosecution]
(critiquing the belief that Caesar feared prosecution if he returned to Italy); G.R. Stanton, Why Did
Caesar Cross the Rubicon?, 52 HISTORIA: ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ALTE GESCHICHTE 67 (2003)
(contending that fear of prosecution was very much a motivating factor).
18. See Morstein-Marx, Did CaesarCross the Rubicon?, supra note 17.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

24. INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL
AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS 61, 85, 92 n.227 (2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/reporticrc-meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-28-march-2014 [hereinafter ICRC REPORT].
25. Id. at 65 (noting that the vast majority of these weapons systems are designed to target

material, aircraft, vessels at sea, and inbound missiles). Paul Scharre and Michael Horrowitz, in a
2015 working paper, listed sixteen "[s]elected [e]xamples of [h]uman-[s]upervised [a]utonomous
[w]eapon [s]ystems." Paul Scharre & Michael Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon
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While the recasting of the ancient Roman story isn't particularly

problematic,26 the same cannot be said for The Campaign's efforts. Framing
the debate in terms of killer robots has rocketed LAWS onto the
international stage while dooming the discussions such framing
engendered. 7
This article explores that parasitic symbiosis by critiquing The

Campaign's source documents, Losing Humanity and the SR Report.2 ' Both
documents, and The Campaign itself, attempt to incite moral panic 29 in order
to stimulate a discussion and ultimately, a ban on LAWS. 30 They do so by
casting into the indeterminate future 3 ' and projecting visions of so-called
killer robots.32 These marketing efforts have succeeded on several levels.33

Academics, 34 a host of Nobel Laureates, 35 and NGOs from around the world

Systems 21 (Ctr. for a New Am. Sec. Working Paper, 2015). Other estimates are that "[a]s many as
40 nations are currently developing military robotics" and "[s]ome weapons already in use may be
considered 'autonomous."' Steven Gross, The U.S. Should Oppose the U.N 's Attempt to Ban
Autonomous Weapons, HERITAGE FouND. (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2015/03/the-us-should-oppose-the-uns-attempt-to-ban-autonomous-weapons.
26. Indeed, the story, while perhaps apocryphal, "may actually speak to us even more profoundly

than a more historically correct version, since we too have observed in our own lifetime catastrophes
of human judgment whose possible consequences we might have pause to think over a little bit
longer." Morstein-Marx, supranote 17.
27. See infra Section III.B.
28. See infra Part III.
29. Moral panic is "exaggerated or misdirected public concern, anxiety, fear, or anger over a
perceived threat to social order." Charles Krinsky, Introduction: The Moral Panic Concept in THE
ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MORAL PANICS 1, 1 (Charles Krinsky ed., Ashgate Publ'g Ltd.

2013).
30. See infra Part III.C.
31. See, e.g., Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 1 (claiming that killer robots "could be

developed within 20-30 years.").
32. As one of the authors of the term "killer-robots" noted: "no government wants to be seen as
pro-killer-robot." Rose Eveleth, So What Exactly Is a 'Killer Robot'?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 20, 2014),

http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/calling-autonomous-weapons-killer-robotsis-genius/378799/ (quoting Mary Wareham, coordinator of The Campaign). Eveleth contends that
The Campaign "has gained momentum as the technology and militarization of robotics has
advanced, and the smartest thing the movement has done is pick its name. 'Killer robots' still isn't a

well-defined term, but it's clearly a winning one." Id.
33. See infra notes 34-41.
34. See Chronology, supra note 5. In July 2015, a group of robotics and artificial intelligence
researchers added their voices to the cause, but in the process further demonstrated how confusing
the LAWS issue is. See Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchers,
FUTURE LIFE INST. (July 28, 2015), http://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/
[hereinafter Autonomous Weapons]. The letter calls for a ban, but only on offensive autonomous
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have added their support.3 6 The Campaign has continued to grow and has

expanded its efforts by using public outreach,37 engaging elected officials,"
and encouraging stateS39 and private companies40 to agree to a ban. And in
2013, States Parties to the CCW agreed that LAWS were within the treaty's
mandate.4 1
Yet despite this rapidly gained, seemingly unstoppable momentum, all

that has occurred at CCW LAWS meetings are confused and circular
discussions about terminology and agreements to future discussions.4 2
weapons, and even then only on those that are beyond meaningful human control. Id. This call
makes The Campaign's proposal seem coherent in contrast. See id. The signatories of the open

letter include Stephen Hawking, Steve Wosniak, and Elon Musk. See id. Hawking and Musk would
fit right in The Campaign's moral panic department. See supra note 29. Hawking has predicted that

advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) "spell the end of the human race," while Musk claims AI
"could be far more dangerous than nuclear weapons" and compared it to "summoning a demon."
See Patrick Tucker, The Military's New Year's Resolution for Artificial Intelligence, DEFONE
(Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.defenseone.com/tecbnology/2014/12/militarys-new-years-resolutionartificial-intelligence/102102/. Interestingly, The Campaign "welcome[d]" the letter, which The
Campaign described as "calling for a ban on autonomous weapons." Artificial Intelligence Experts
Call for a Ban, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2015/

07/aicall/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2016). Yet as described above, the open letter does not call for a ban
on autonomous weapons writ large, but only the subset categories of (1) offensive autonomous
weapons, (2) which are beyond meaningful human control. See Autonomous Weapons, supra.
35. See Nobel Laureates Call for Killer Robots Ban, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS,
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2014/06/nobelpeace/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
36. See Who We Are, supra note 5.
37. See Public Outreach in the Netherlands, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS (Sept. 30,
2014), https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2014/09/netherlands/ (describing community engagement
efforts in the Netherlands); Stop Killer Robots (@BanKillerRobots), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
BanKillerRobots (last visited Oct. 26, 2016); Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/stopkillerrobots (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
38. See CongressionalBriefing on Killer Robots, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS (July 17,

2014), https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2014/07/uscongress/
lobbying efforts).

(describing The Campaign's U.S.

39. By the conclusion of the April 2016 CCW LAWS meetings, fourteen States had joined The
Campaign's call for a ban. Ban Support Grows, Process Goes Slow, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER
ROBOTS (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2016/04/thirdmtg/ (listing Algeria,

Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Holy See, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
State of Palestine, and Zimbabwe).
40. Company Pledges It Won't Develop Killer Robots, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS
(Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2014/08/clearpath/ (explaining the purported firstever company pledge to not develop killer robots).
41. Background-Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UNITED NATIONS OFF. GENEVA,

http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF8 1C1257CE600393DF6?O
penDocument (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Background].
42. See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36
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While there are a variety of reasons for this lack of substantive progress, lost

in the LAWS debate thus far is the role The Campaign's use of the term
"killer robots" plays in both enabling the CCW talks and setting those talks
up for stagnation, if not failure. 43

On close scrutiny, The Campaign's efforts have been only superficially
successful and have come at a self-defeating substantive cost.4 4

Having

provoked the international community to envision potential dire harm from
killer robots, the called-for ban would include not only future "fully
autonomous" weapons systems that don't (and may never) exist, but also
unspecified current weapons systems. 45 The real issue, the real concern, is
(or should be) weapons system autonomy in certain critical functions:

notably, selecting and engaging targets, or in other words, determining what
to fire at and then firing.46 But weapons that select and engage targets
without further human intervention have long been in use, and with little
controversy.4 7

Perhaps recognizing that this circle cannot be squared,48 Losing

CARDOzO L. REv. 1837, 1837 (2015) (claiming that "no one has yet put forward a coherent
definition of autonomy in weapon systems").
43. The debates continue, but for the most part they focus on the substance of a ban and whether
LAWS could comply with international humanitarian law-not on the framing of the debate itself.
For two such examples, see Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapons Systems and International
HumanitarianLaw: A Reply to the Critics, HARv. NAT'L. SEC. J. 2 (2013) and Russell Christian, The
'KillerRobots' Accountability Gap, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2015/04/08/killer-robots-accountability-gap.
44. See infra Part III.
45. See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.

46. See infra Part III.B. As discussed in this article, even narrowing the discussion to systems
that select and engage targets without further human intervention still yields challenges, namely,

how to consider the host of weapons that, while fired or launched by a human, perform active and
passive ftnctions to select and engage a target. See infra Sections III.C, V.A-B.
47. See ICRC REPORT, supra note 24, at 11.
48. Referring to the ancient Greek mathematical challenge of constructing a square that has the

same area as a circle:
The ancient Greeks had posed various problems, namely to do various constructions with
a straight edge and compass, and there were all sorts of constructions they could do, but
one of the things they could never figure out how to do was to square the circle. And the
realization in modern times, really in the 1800's, was that it's impossible. That no matter
what construction you do with a straight edge and compass, no matter how complicated it
is, you will never be able to square the circle. You will never be able to find a square
with the same area as the circle. So that was somehow a real shift in realizing that it
doesn't make sense to keep trying to do this. In fact the answer is, it can't be done.
Can't Square the Circle, MATHEMATICAL SCI. RES. INST., http://www.msri.org/web/msri/pages/99
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Humanity and the SR Report utilize generalized differentiation by purporting

that current weapons systems should be included in the ban by using
descriptors,4 9 not specifics. 0 While this partially conceals the paradoxical
nature of their overall efforts, it also yields calls for bans that cannot or will

not specify what's actually being banned.
We should not be surprised that calls for regulation that are incapable of

detailing what should be regulated do not set the conditions for a
constructive dialogue.5 2 The result of The Campaign's efforts is akin to a
car speeding towards and into a cul-de-sac-that the car has reached the cul-

(last visited Oct. 26, 2016). What follows is that "whenever you pose a problem, you have to ask

yourself a question, namely, is it, could it be that the answer to what you're saying, namely, 'do such
and such' is 'it can't be done."' Id. To this author's thinking, approximating the status quo in the
LAWS debate, I contend it is functionally impossible to craft a preemptive ban on speculative future
systems that also includes long-existing systems with minimal controversy. See infra Part III.
Under this view, those seeking a ban-however well intentioned they may be-are like a millennia
of mathematicians trying to square the circle: doomed to fail. See Can't Square the Circle, supra.
To be clear, that The Campaign's efforts, in my view, will fail does not mean they shouldn't seek a
ban. But the manner by which they are trying to do so confuses more than clarifies. See infra Part
III. And whatever credit is due for raising awareness is mitigated, if not eliminated, by the sidewise
direction their efforts have caused the substantive debate to take at the CCW. See infra Section
III. C, Part IV.
49. These descriptors include whether a human is in, on, or out of the weapons-firing decision-

making loop, and what the differences are between automated, automatic, and autonomous.

See

infra notes 268-82 and accompanying text. Discussed later in this article, these descriptors oversimplify autonomy and convey a static or fixed status. See infra Section III.B. As a result, they are
not useful to discretely characterize weapons systems. See infra Section II.B.2.b.
50. See infra Part III.
51. The Campaign would, and has, disagreed with the claims that there is confusion as to what is

meant by LAWS, and that constructive dialogue requires at least a working definition of LAWS.
See Statement by Stephen Goose of Human Rights Watch, CONVENTION ON CERTAIN
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(http
Assets)/252007F8C3EB3ElEC1257FAE002F4DE5/$file/HRW+intervention+Goose+12+April+201
6.pdf (referring to the claims that "[w]e don't know what we are talking about" and that "[w]e must

have an agreed upon definition before [UN CCW] can proceed any further" as "fallacies"). Yet
within minutes of Mr. Goose's remarks at the 2016 CCW LAWS meeting in which he insisted "there
is a common understanding in the room .... [that w]e are talking about future weapons ... [that]
will be able to select and engage targets on their own," the ICRC delivered remarks which
highlighted that "[s]ome weapon systems in use today can select and attack targets without human
intervention." Id.; Statement of the International Committee of the Red Cross, CONVENTION ON
CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/9324B81015529E3DC1257F930057AF12/$file/2016_LAWS+MXGeneralExchange
StatementsICRC.pdf.
52. See SR Report, supra note 3; Losing Humanity, supranote 8.
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de-sac quickly is meaningless." And once there, the options are limited and

unproductive: stop, withdraw, or drive in circles. For that to change, the
LAWS discussion must move beyond and away from the debate imposed by
The Campaign's conceptual framework.54 This article seeks to prompt just

such a move."

In highlighting the conceptual dissonance that The

Campaign has fostered, this article seeks to reframe the debate and proposes

a moratorium on a subset of LAWS-those weapons systems primarily
designed to lethally target personnel. While seemingly counterintuitive,
such a moratorium offers practical and strategic advantages for both The
Campaign and the First World States Parties to CCW that already employ
LAWS. 56

Part I explores the challenges in trying to define system autonomy,
focusing on prior failed efforts to construct levels and otherwise categorize
autonomy.5 7 Part II then applies the concept of autonomy to weapons
systems, discussing autonomous and then semi-autonomous weapons and
providing examples, including untoward instances in which autonomous
weapons killed humans.5 8 Having established a baseline of the challenges
inherent in the autonomy discussion, the article then considers the manner
by which The Campaign's primary references, Losing Humanity and the SR
Report, utilize moral panic and the conceptual disconnect that follows."
Part IV then explains the manifestation of that disconnect through the lack of

'

progress at CCW.60 Part V proposes and explains an alternative to a LAWS
ban, following which the article concludes. 6

53. A cul-de-sac is "a street, lane, etc., closed at one end; blind alley; dead-end street" or
equally appropriate here, "any situation in which further progress is impossible."
Cul-de-sac,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/cul-de-sac (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
54. See Who We Are, supra note 5 (emphasizing that The Campaign's conceptual framework
polarizes the policy options regarding LAWS into the options of complete prohibition or complete
allowance, rather than allowing for a discussion about the breadth of options that countries may
have); see also Crootof, supra note 42, at 1837 (asserting that the lack of a current, coherent
definition of autonomy leads to the "conflation of legal, ethical, policy, and political arguments").
55. See infra Part V.
56. See infra PartV.
57. See infra Part I.
58. See infra Part II.
59. See infra Part III.
60. See infra Part IV.
61. See infra Part V.
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I. AUTONOMY

A threshold challenge in discussing LAWS is that there are wildly
varied understandings of what is meant by autonomy in general, let alone as
applied to weapons systems.62 Given autonomy's complex nature, this
shouldn't be surprising. 63 These different understandings set the conditions
for a debate-the substantive inconsistencies of which border on
incoherence. 64 Thus, it would be tremendous progress for the international

community if there was a complete and utter lack of consensus regarding
whether to develop and employ LAWS, but agreement as to what LAWS
meant.65

But currently, the international community cannot even agree

about what they disagree about.66
This has been aptly, if unfortunately, demonstrated at the CCW LAWS

meetings.

67

Summarizing technical issues, the chair of a 2014 meeting

stated that,
During the whole debate on technical issues of lethal autonomous

weapons systems, the notion of autonomy and its definition was at
the center of interest. It became quite obvious that there is no
ready-made, generally accepted definition of what is an
"autonomous system" and as to where to draw the line between

"autonomous" and "automatic" or "automated."6 8
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research succinctly
explained how the discussion of LAWS
62. See Michael Biontino, Summary of Technical Issues at CCW Expert Meeting Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LA WS), GERMAN PERMANENT MISSIONS GENEVA (May 16, 2014),
http://www.genf.diplo.de/Vertretung/genf/en/Archives-en/Aktuell-en-2014/2014-05-16-laws-technic

al_20issues.html.
63. Thomas, supra note 62, at 240-41 (observing that the level of a robot's independence can
range anywhere from "automated" to "autonomous," each with its own, complex definition).
64. See generally Biontino, supra note 62 (showing how the varying definitions of the words
"automatic," "automated," and "autonomous" create a forum with limited agreement between the
involved parties); see also Dr. Gregory P. Noone & Dr. Diana C. Noone, The Debate Over
Autonomous Weapons Systems, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 25, 27-28 (2015) (describing the
different ways in which "autonomous" is defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross,

the Human Rights Watch, the Department of Defense, and the Navy).
65. See generally Biontino, supra note 62.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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presently lacks focus, tacking between things (for example, drones,

robots and systems), a characteristic (autonomy) and uses
(defensive measures? targeting? kill decisions?), in an inconsistent
and often confusing way.

One of the reasons there are so many

different terms being proposed as the object of discussion is that
some actors are trying to capture a mix of variables of concern

(such as lethality or degrees of human control), while others are
talking about more general categories of objects.69
The international discussion could draw from the U.S. militaries'
unsuccessful efforts in conceptualizing and explaining autonomy. 70 In 2012,
the U.S. Defense Science Board Task Force (DSB) issued a report, "The
Role of Autonomy in [Department of Defense (DoD)] Systems," in support

of its mandate to "assist the DoD in understanding and preparing to take
maximum practical advantage of advances in autonomy." 7
reflected in the DSB's executive summary:

That mandate is

Unmanned systems are proving to have a significant impact on
warfare worldwide. The true value of these systems is not to
provide a direct human replacement, but rather to extend and
complement human capability in a number of ways. These systems

extend human reach by providing potentially unlimited persistent
capabilities without degradation due to fatigue or lack of attention.
Unmanned systems offer the warfighter more options and flexibility
to access hazardous environments, work at small scales, or react at
speeds and scales beyond human capability. With proper design of

bounded autonomous capabilities, unmanned systems can also
reduce the high cognitive
load currently placed on

69. U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH (UNIDIR), FRAMING DISCUSSIONS ON THE
WEAPONIZATION OF INCREASINGLY AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2014), http://www.

unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/framing-discussions-on-the-weaponization-of-increasingly-autono
mous-technologies-en-606.pdf [hereinafter UNIDIR].
70. See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text; see also Noone & Noone, supranote 64.
71. DEP'T OF DEF., DEF. SCI. BD., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD

SYSTEMS (July 2012), http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf [hereinafter DSB REPORT].
The DSB REPORT is included in this article primarily for its assessment of why DoD's efforts to

explain autonomy, well-intentioned though they may have been, were unsuccessful. Id. To the
extent the article references how the DSB claims autonomy should be viewed, that is offered only as
one science board's view to one State's military. Id.
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operators/supervisors.

Moreover, increased autonomy can enable

humans to delegate those tasks that are more effectively done by
computer, including synchronizing activities between multiple
unmanned systems, software agents and warfighters-thus freeing

humans to focus on more complex decision making.7 2
But for DoD to fully leverage (or the international community to
constructively discuss) advances in autonomy, a shared and coherent

understanding of machine or system autonomy is required.7 3 DoD had
neither.74 Instead, the DSB labeled the "pervasive [DoD] effort to define
autonomy" as "counter-productive." 7 5

What had been occurring was that different U.S. military services
(Army, Navy, and Air Force) were "making significant investments of time

and money to develop definitions of autonomy" yet "[t]he competing
definitions for autonomy . .. led to confusion." 76 And that confusion may
have "contribut[ed] to fears of unbounded autonomy."7 7 The end result was
''a waste of both time and money spent debating and reconciling different

terms"' that were "irrelevant to the real problems."79
The DoD's definitional efforts "have been unsatisfactory because they
typically try to express autonomy as a widget or discrete component."o The
DSB criticized the U.S. militaries' attempt to develop "autonomy roadmaps"
that were based on trying to correlate levels and types of computer functions

needed for a certain level of autonomy.81 The DSB countered that "[t]hough
attractive," it is neither useful nor helpful to think of the concept of

72. Id.
73. See generally UNIDIR, supra note 69.
74. Id.; DSB REPORT, supra note 71, at 23.
75. DSB REPORT, supranote 71, at 23.

76. Id.
77. Id. The report acknowledged that "the word 'autonomy' often conjures images in the press
and the minds of some military leaders of computers making independent decisions and taking
uncontrolled action." Id. Noting the concern about fears of "unbounded autonomy" was timely
indeed-within four months of the DSB REPORT, Losing Humanity was published. See Losing
Humanity, supranote 8.
78. Jeffrey M. Bradshaw, Robert R. Hoffinan, Matthew Johnson, and David D. Woods, The
Seven Deadly Myths of Autonomous Systems, 28 IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, no. 3, May-June
2013, at 2, 4, http://www.jeffreymbradshaw.net/publications/IS-28-03-HCC1 .pdf.
79. Id.
80. DSB REPORT, supranote 70, at 23.
81. Id.
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autonomy in levels.8 2

This is in part because of the dynamic nature of

functions within a system.83 Many functions can be executed "concurrently
as well as sequentially . .. and can have a different allocation scheme to the
human or computer at a given time." 84

Autonomy is better thought of across not one but several spectrums. 85
And within each spectrum the amount or quality of functions a machine

performs often varies and changes as the system operates. 86 As a result,
plotting autonomy as a linear and single axis progressively and discretely
demarcated by whether humans are in, on, or out of a functional loop both
oversimplifies and misrepresents. 7
It is just another form of
conceptualizing autonomy in levels, which, as discussed, is neither useful

nor helpful.
Similarly, attempting to broadly differentiate machine functions as
either automatic, automated, or autonomous lacks practical utility.89 These
terms may be used to understand only one of the spectrums through which
we conceptualize autonomy-the complexity of the machine. This spectrum
ranges from automatic at the lower end, to automated in the middle, to
autonomous at the higher end.90 But again this is only one spectrum, the
utility of which is limited, because there are no clear boundaries between
automatic, automated, or autonomous-a point which CCW States Parties

82. Id. at 24.
83. Id.; see also Bradshaw et al., supra note 78, at 2. Thinking of autonomy in levels is also
problematic because "autonomy is relative to the context of activity. Functions can't be automated
effectively in isolation from an understanding of the task, the goals, and the context. . . . [L]evels of
autonomy encourage reductive thinking. For example, they facilitate the perspective that activity is
sequential when it's actually simultaneous." Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted) (citing P.J. Feltovich et al.,
Keeping It Too Simple: How the Reductive Tendency Affects Cognitive Engineering, 19 IEEE
INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, no. 3, May-June 2004, at 90, 90-94.
84. Bradshaw et al., supra note 78, at 4.
85. Thomas, supra note 62, at 241.
86. Paul Scharre, Between a Roomba and a Terminator: What is Autonomy?, WAR ON ROCKS
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/between-a-roomba-and-a-terminator-what-isautonomy/. Three such spectrums are the "nature of the human-machine command and control
relationship," the "complexity of the machine," and the "type of decision being automated." Id.

87. See id.
88. See Biontino, supra note 62; see also Scharre, supra note 86 (stating that it is "meaningless
to refer to a machine as 'autonomous' or 'semiautonomous' without specifying the task or function
being automated").
89. See Scharre, supra note 86.

90. Id.
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are either learning or relearning.91

Artificial intelligence researcher Noel Sharkey proposed one way to
distinguish the spectrum.92 He describes an automatic robot as one that
"carries out a pre-programmed sequence of operations or moves in a
structured environment. A good example is a robot arm painting a car." 9' In
contrast, "[a]n autonomous robot is similar to an automatic machine except

that it operates in open or unstructured environments." 94
That may seem like a practical depiction by which to discern whether a
machine is automatic or autonomous-and The Campaign's primary sources
reference it as such. 95 But without including what is meant by open and
unstructured, it is another example of trying to define a difficult concept

using terms that are either ambiguous or themselves open to debate. 6 The
lack of functional utility becomes readily apparent in trying to apply the
depiction beyond car-painting robot arms.
Consider the following assessment of a household cleaning device, the
Roomba robotic vacuum cleaner:
The Roomba must navigate a house full of obstacles while ensuring
that the carpet is cleaned.

goals (vacuum the
of day, etc.). The
identify the room
battery, etc). The

. ..

The Roomba user provides high-level

floor, but don't vacuum here, vacuum at this time
Roomba must make some choices itself (how to
geometry, avoid obstacles, when to recharge its
Roomba also has some automated behavior and

encounters situations it cannot resolve on its own (e.g., it gets stuck,

it can't clean its own brushes, etc.). Overall, the Roomba has
marginal autonomy, and there are numerous situations it cannot deal
with by itself. It is certainly not intelligent. However, it does have
basic on-board diagnostic capability ("clean my brushes!") and a
strategy ...

for vacuuming a room about whose size and layout it

&

91. Id.; see generally Biontino, supra note 62 (emphasizing the lack of understanding in the
current discussion about the role of autonomy related to LAWS).
92. See Neil Sharkey, Automating Warfare: Lessons Learnedfrom the Drones, 21 J.L. INF.

Sci. 140, 141 (2011).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 12; SR Report, supra note 3,
96. See supra Section III.A.2; see also SR Report, supranote 3, ¶ 42.

142.
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was initially ignorant.97

Where should the Roomba be placed within the human-machine
Autonomous?9 8
Automated?
spectrum?
Is the Roomba automatic?
Similarly, where in the loop should a household thermostat or microwave
oven be placed? The answer-which further illustrates that we cannot draw
system-wide conclusions from this spectrum-is that we don't know without
more information about the system. 99 Certain thermostats and microwave

'

ovens would likely be considered automated, while others, capable of
sensing and adjusting their operation, are more likely autonomous.' 00 But
again, the lines are fuzzy and machine complexity is just one spectrum. 0
According to the DSB, DoD's focus instead should be on achieving "a
capability through the best combination of human and machine abilities"

with a goal of "creating a joint human-machine cognitive system."

02

In other words, autonomy isn't a discrete property of a work system,
nor is it a particular kind of technology; it's an idealized
characterization of observed or anticipated interactions between the
machine, the work to be accomplished, and the situation. To the
degree that autonomy is actually realized in practice, it's through

97. See Chad R. Frost, Challenges and Opportunitiesfor Autonomous Systems in Space, in
FRONTIERS OF ENGINEERING: REPORTS ON LEADING-EDGE ENGINEERING FROM THE 2010

SYMPOSIUm 89, 90 (2011).
98. Similarly, consider driving a car-its features and functions are activated by the human
driver versus the car itself. See Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 25, at 5 ("Most cars today include
anti-lock brakes, traction and stability control, power steering, emergency seat belt retractors and air
bags. Higher-end cars may include intelligent cruise control, automatic lane keeping, collision
avoidance and automatic parking.").
99. See infra note 100; see also Scharre, supranote 86.
100. Noted philosopher of technology Peter Asaro distinguishes automated from autonomous on
the grounds that unsupervised automated systems "involve repetitive, structured, routine operations

without much feedback information (such as a dishwasher)," while autonomous systems operate in
"dynamic, unstructured, open environments based on feedback information from a variety of sensors
(such as a self driving car)." Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human
Rights, Automation, and the DehumanizationofLethal DecisionMaking, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS,

no. 866, 2012, at 690 n.5. This approach is useful to the same extent as Professor Sharkey's. See

&

Sharkey, supra note 92. Assuming one can apply the approach to weapons systems, it's unclear how
extant LAWS are more comparable to the dishwasher than the self-driving car, let alone why the
focus is on overall categorization and not critical functions such as engagement. See, e.g., Scharre
Horowitz, supra note 25.
101. See Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 25, at 5.
102. DSB REPORT, supranote 71, at 23.
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the combination of these interactions.' 03

The DSB proposed a "dynamic view of human machine interaction" that
broadly refers to autonomy as "a capabilityof the larger system enabled by
the integration of human and machine abilities." 104
This approach
recognizes that the operation of all machines requires some degree of human
involvement. 105 This means that "there exist no fully autonomous systems,
just as there are no fully autonomous soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines." 106

The point that autonomy is limited extends to weapons systems as wellthere is no such thing as a fully autonomous weapon. 0 7
As one commentator observed, "the question of when we will get to
'full autonomy' is meaningless. There is not a single spectrum along which
autonomy moves.

. .

. [A] better framework would be to ask what tasks are

done by a person and which by a machine."' 08

Exploring how DoD is

attempting to parse out that task allocation within the context of weapons
systems is by no means dispositive of the "right answer." But those efforts
provide a useful frame of reference by which to discuss specific weapons

systems, Losing Humanity, and the SR Report. 0 9
II. LAWS
In 2012, DoD issued a directive on "Autonomy in Weapon Systems

based on prior DSB work.""1 0 The directive "[e]stablishes DoD policy and
assigns responsibilities for the development and use of autonomous and

103. Bradshaw et al., supranote 78. Another way to think of autonomous machines is in terms of
the extent of self-directedness and self-sufficiency. Id.
104. DSB REPORT, supranote 71, at 23-24.

105. See id.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. As the President of the ICRC observed in 2011 (referring to "truly" as opposed to "fully"
autonomous weapons), "such systems have not yet been weaponised. Their development represents

a monumental programming challenge that may well prove impossible."

Jakob Kellenberger,

President, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Keynote Address at the 34th Round Table of Current
Issues of International Humanitarian Law (Sept. 8, 2011) (transcript available at https://
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/new-weapon-technologies-statement-2011-09-08.
htm).
108. See Scharre, supra note 86.
109. See infra Section III.A.
110. DEP'T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE 3000.9, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS (2012),
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE].
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semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including manned and

unmanned platforms.""1
That the policy on autonomous weapons systems applies to manned as
well as unmanned platforms reflects the concept of autonomy as the

capability of a system that integrates human and machine abilities." 2 It also
reinforces the idea that autonomy is better thought of across several

spectrums.1 3
As discussed above, asking whether a system is autonomous shouldn't
yield an answer but rather a series of questions, including clarification of
what functions within the system the questions refer to.11 4 In the context of
weapons systems, the functions generating the most concern are the

selecting and engaging of targets. Whether and how a weapons system
performs those functions without further human input is at the core of the
debate.'
The DoD policy defines an autonomous weapons system as:
A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets
without further intervention by a human operator. This includes
human-supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to

allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system,
but can select and engage targets without further human input after
activation.116

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 1.
See Bradshaw et al., supra note 78; DSB REPORT, supranote 71.
See Scharre, supra note 86.
See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
See Schmitt, supra note 43; DoD Directive, supra note 110, at 1.
DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 110, at 13-14. The DoD Directive requires parsing and may be

seen by some as either disingenuous or inconsistent, at least in part. Id. While not clearly stated, the
policy allows at least certain types of LAWS to kill people. See id. at 3. "Autonomous weapons
may be used to apply non-lethal, non-kinetic force," while at the same time the definition includes
human-supervised autonomous weapons. Id. Human-supervised autonomous weapons systems may

be used to "select and engage targets" with lethal force, without engaging humans as targets. Id.
But human-supervised autonomous systems may employ lethal force in defense of manned
installations and platforms. Id. While some attacks may involve only munitions-firing mortars or
rockets for example, others involve manned planes, boats, and vehicles. Id. Ultimately, the policy
allows for the use of human-supervised LAWS against such manned systems, just requiring that the

system, the plane, the boat, or the vehicle, be the specific target, not the human crew/occupants. See
id. Often, the end result for the human crew and occupants will be the same whether a LAWS
targets them specifically or the system in which they are operating. See id.
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Of note, this definition makes no reference to or distinction based on

automated, automatic, and autonomous weapons systems." 7 The definition
simply flows from weapons systems that can select and engage targets
without further human input.

8

While this may seem straight-forward, when

later dealing with Losing Humanity and the SR Report, it becomes anything
but.119

Under the DoD Policy, the human override in the event of a weapons
systems' malfunction would need to occur "before unacceptable levels of
damage occur."1 20 This implicitly recognizes both that "damage" will occur
and that some level of untoward harm, while not desirable, is acceptable.1 2 1
Indeed, the LAWS conversation must acknowledge that weapons systems

capable of selecting and engaging targets without further human intervention
have existed for decades, as well as the unfortunate fact that they have
already taken human life. 122
A.

Autonomous Weapons System Examples

In a report following a 2014 expert meeting, the International
Committee of the Red Cross provided a sampling of existing weapons
systems, "for which critical functions (i.e. acquiring, tracking, selecting and
attacking targets) are autonomous." 1 23 The examples include:
*

"Patriot surface-to-air missile system; a missile defence
system that automatically detects, and tracks targets before
firing interceptor missiles";1 24

*

"Aegis Weapon System; a ship-based system combining

117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See infra Section III.B.
120. DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 110, at 14.

121. See id.
122. See generally Kim R. Holmes, Drones, Robots and the Human Factorin War, WASH. TIMES
(Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/27/kim-holmes-lethal-autonom
ous-weapon-system-ban-no-/; see also infra Section II.A.
123. ICRC Report, supra note 24, at 65 n.40.
124. Id. (citing Global Patriot Solutions, RAYTHEON http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/
products/patriot/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2016). First employed in the late 1970s, the Patriot is utilized
by the United States and twelve other countries. Id.
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radar to automatically detect and track targets with various

missile and gun systems";1 25
*

"Phalanx Close-in Weapon System; a ship-based 20 mm
gun system that autonomously detects, tracks and attacks
targets"; 126

*

"Goalkeeper Close-in Weapon System,1 27 an autonomous
and completely automatic weapon system for short-range
defence of ships against highly maneuverable missiles,
aircraft and fast maneuvering surface vessels";1 28

*

"Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar System; a landbased

fixed weapon

system that

employs

the

same

technology as the Phalanx Close-in Weapon System to
target and attack rockets, artillery and mortars";1 29
*

"Iron Dome; a ground based air defence system which

125. Id. (citing Aegis

Weapon System,

AM.'s NAVY,

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact

display.asp?cid=2100&tid=200&ct=2 (last updated Jan. 5, 2016)). First employed in 1978, Aegis is
utilized by the US and four other countries. Id.
126. Id. (citing MK 15-Phalanx Close-in Weapons System (CIWS), AM.'S NAVY, http://
www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_print.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct-2&page=1 (last updated May 9,
2016); SeaRAM Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) Anti-Ship Missile Defense System, AM.'s
NAvY, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact-display.asp?cid=2100&tid=456&ct=2 (last updated May
10, 2016)). Used since 1980, the Phalanx is installed on all U.S. Navy surface combatant ship
classes and on those of twenty-four allied nations.
Phalanx Close-in Weapon
System, RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/phalanx/ (last visited Oct. 26,

2016) [hereinafter Phalanx]. Other countries have developed

or employ CIWS

variants.

See Scharre & Horowitz, supranote 25 (describing the Russian made Kashtan CIWS used by China

and India), Kelvin Fong, CIWS: The Last-Ditch Defence, ASIAN DEF. J. (July-Aug. 2008), 1820, http://gallery.military.ir/albums/userpics/CIWSarticle.pdf (discussing CIWS made or used by
Denmark, Germany, Israel, Russia, and South Korea); Defensa Antimisil Meroka (CIWS-Close in
Weapon System), FOLOR MILrrAR GENERAL, http://www.militar.org.ua/militar/artilleria/artillerianaval-meroka-ciws.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (describing the Meroka Missile Defense, a

Spanish CIWS).
127. ICRC Report, supra note 24, at 65 n.40. "Goalkeeper is operational in the navies of
Belgium, Chile, the Netherlands, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, the UAE and the UK."
Goalkeeper-Close-in Weapon System, THALES, https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/netherlands/
defence/goalkeeper-close-weapon-system (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter THALES].
128. THALES, supra note 127.
129. ICRC Report, supra note 17, at 65 n.40.
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automatically

selects

targets

and

fires

interceptor

missiles"; 130
*

"NBC MANTIS (Modular, Automatic and Networkcapable Targeting and Interception System); an automated
ground based air defence system using 35 mm 3guns to

automatically target rocket, artillery and mortars."'
The majority of those weapons systems are not new; they have been
used for decades to varying degrees.132 As a result, it's challenging to
assemble a coherent contemporary argument as to why 1980s weapons
systems employed with minimal issues are now problematic."' Perhaps
focusing on the looming prospect of fully autonomous weapons is easier,

superficially anyway, than trying to articulate a retrospective argument.1 34
But what is it about autonomy-beyond machines selecting and
engaging targets without human intervention-that is worrisome? Because
full autonomy, if even possible, would be unbounded, depicting it in two

dimensions is challenging. Consider full autonomy as the oval below,
comprised of any number of functions (presumably infinite) depicted as the
smaller sub ovals.1 35

130. Id. (citing Iron Dome, RAFAEL ADVANCED DEF. SYSTEMS LTD., http://www.rafael.co.il/
Marketing/186-1530-en/Marketing.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2010)).
131. Id.; see also World Premiers at Eurosatory 2016, RHEINMETALL DEF. (June 13, 2016),
http://www.rheinmetall-defence.com/en/rheinmetalldefence/public-relations/news/latestnews/aktu

ellesdetailansicht_110496.php.
132. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
133. Cf Mark Gubrud, Why Should We Ban Autonomous Weapons? To Survive, IEEE SPECTRUM
(June 1, 2016), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/military-robots/why-should-we-ban-

autonomous-weapons-to-survive (asserting that opposition to lethal autonomous weapons has been
present for decades, but thus far has not prevented the proliferation of such machines and systems).
134. See Autonomous Weapon Systems: Is It Morally Acceptable for a Machine to Make Life and
Death Decisions?, INT'L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/
document/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-LAWS (urging countries to consider the ethical and
legal issues raised by autonomous weapons).
135. See infra Figure 1.
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Figure 1. 'FULL AUTONOMY'

There is space, an autonomy "delta" (A), between full autonomy and
autonomy in the function of selecting and engaging targets. 13 6 Among other

functions, this delta could be manifested by logistics trucksl 37 or aircrafts,1 38
for example, capable of recharging or reloading themselves or performing
internal diagnostic assessments and repairs.
To ground the LAWS debate in full autonomy requires articulating what
is concerning about weapons systems beyond the capability to select and

engage targets without human intervention. 139
Consider a hypothetical weapons system "A," which performs all
manner of functions autonomously except the selection and engagement of
targets.1

40

136. See supra Figure 1.
137. See Lance M. Bacon, Unmanned Vehicles Heading for Battlefield, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 2,
2013, at 13 (describing the U.S. Army's plans for driverless trucks).
138. See Joe Gould, Army Seeks to Cut Casualties with Unmanned Delivery Craft, ARMY TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2014, at 22; Aaron Mehta, Sikorsky Plans FirstFlight of Autonomous Black Hawk, ARMY
TIMES, May 14, 2014 (describing the U.S. Army's plans for unmanned aerial delivery systems,
which would not be remotely piloted, but would autonomously perform flight functions).
139. See supra Part I (discussing the difficulty of defining autonomy, thereby requiring clarity
over concerns other than selecting and engaging targets without human intervention). Otherwise the
argument could (and this article contends it should) focus on weapons systems capable of selecting
and engaging targets without further human intervention. See infra Part V. But this would require
acknowledging that the LAWS discussion involves extant and future systems, which The Campaign
is not able to concede and maintain positional coherence. See infra Section III.A.1 (discussing The
Campaign's failure to acknowledge extant autonomous weapons systems).
140. See infra Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Hypothetical Weapons System A
Hypothetical Weapon System A
*
*
*
*

Self Driving
Self Fueling
Self Repairing
Self Loading of ammunition

*

Human selects and engages

targt
Now consider the inverse of A, hypothetical system "B," in which
humans perform virtually all the functions, but B, not a human operator,
selects and engages targets.'4 1
Figure 3. Hypothetical Weapons System B
Hypothetical Weapons System B
*
*
*
*

Human
Human
Human
Human

Drives
Fuels
Repairs
loads ammunition

*

Weapons system selects and
engages targets

Which of the functions that the different weapons systems perform are
concerning and by what criteria? As this paper advocates, the LAWS
discussion should focus on the critical functions of selecting and engaging
targets.1 4 2 The conversation about the dangers of full autonomy, apart from
(or in addition to) machines able to select and engage targets without human
141. See infra Figure 3.
142. See infra Part V (proposing a moratorium on LAWS primarily designed to lethally target
personnel).
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intervention,

tends

to

drift

between

science-including

artificial

intelligence1 43 and the concept of singularity'4-and science fiction-

143. John McCarthy, the professor who developed the term artificial intelligence (AI) in 1956,
defined it as "science and engineering of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent
computer programs." Paulo Leitao, Multi-agent Systems in Industry: Current Trends & Future
Challenges, in BEYOND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 197, 198 (Kelemen, Romportl, Zackova ed.,
2013); see also NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES (2014). But
AI means different things to different researchers. ELA KUMAR, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 2
(2008). On the one hand, humans have of course already made any number of intelligent machines,

so one could say AI was reached some time ago.

Id. at 3-4.

But thought of in terms of

superintelligence and a machine having the ability to improve itself, estimates range from decades

from now to a few thousand years, and presumably any number in between. See Luke Muelhauser,

&

When Will Al Be Created?, MACHINE INTELLIGENCE RES. INST. (May 15, 2013),
https://intelligence.org/2013/05/15/when-will-ai-be-created/.
144. While it's unclear whether full autonomy could ever exist, some claim that the possibility
could or would change once "technological singularity" is reached. See Joseph Savirimuthu,
Singularity and the Art of Warfighters: The Geneva Convention on Trial, in SUPER SOLDIERS: THE
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 167, 168-69 (Jai Galliott & Mianna Lotz eds., 2016).
And of course like every other term or concept in this discussion, technological singularity means
very different things to different people, as one article that provides seventeen different definitions
illustrates. Nikola Danaylov, 17 Definitions of the TechnologicalSingularity, INST. FOR ETHICS

EMERGING TECH., (Aug. 22, 2012), http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/danaylov20120822.

Those

outside the computer science field (including this author) tend to forget that the human brain far
outpaces any computer in the world in terms of processing power. Jeremy Hsu, Estimate: Human
Brain 30 Times Faster than Best Supercomputers, IEEE SPECTRUM (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://spectrum.icee.org/tech-talk/computing/networks/estimate-human-brain-30-times-faster-than-

best-supercomputers.

IBM is attempting to "simulate the human brain" through the use a super

computer. Mark Fischetti, IBM Stimulates 4.5 Percent of the Human Brain, and All of the Cat
Brain, SCI. AM. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/graphic-science-ibmsimulates-4-percent-human-brain-all-of-cat-brain/.
"To rival the cortex inside your head, IBM

predicts it will need to hook up 880,000 processors, which it hopes to achieve by 2019." Id.
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/graphic-science-ibm-simulates-4-percent-human-brain-all
-of-cat-brain/. It is this point and this definition of singularity-machines having more processing
power than humans-that for some heralds the end of days. See, e.g., Danaylov, supra. In 1993,
math and computer science professor Vemor Vinge (who popularized the concept of technological

singularity) claimed that "[w]ithin thirty years, we will have the technological means to create
superhuman intelligence. Shortly after, the human era will be ended." Vernor Vinge, The Coming
Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era, in NASA CONF. PUBLICATION
10129, VISION 21 INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IN THE ERA OF HYPERSPACE 11,

11 (1993), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19940022855.pdf.

Professor Vinge,

a mathematics professor, computer scientist, and author, is an interesting example of one whose
works blur the line between science and science fiction. See Who's Afraid of First Movers,
SINGULARITY SUMMIT (2012), http://mindstalk.net/vinge/firstMoversTalk.html. While Vinge's time
estimate for singularity is roughly 2023, Google's engineering director estimates 2045. See Tanya
Lewis, The Singularity is Near: Mind Uploading by 2045?, LIVESCIENCE (June 17, 2013 5:29 PM),
http://www.livescience.com/37499-immortality-by-2045-conference.html; cf Erik Sofge, The EndIs
A.L: The Singularity is Sci-Fi's Faith-Based Initiative, POPULAR SCI. (May 28, 2014),
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including robots
constraints.14 5

somehow

countermanding

human-imposed

operating

We don't know what full autonomy means, if it's even reachable, or if
so, when.1 4 6 This is a challenging foundation upon which to build a call for

a ban.1 47 And it overlooks what we do know: that LAWS have existed for
some time, and there have been untoward outcomes in which LAWS have
killed humans.1 48
B.

Untoward Outcomes
Just as the conversation on LAWS must include that systems have been

in use, some for decades, it must also include that there have been untoward
outcomes. Some incidents were the result of weapon systems that fired or
launched without the direction of a human.1 49 Despite not resulting in any
casualties, on February 26, 1991, during an armed conflict with Iraq, on U.S.

warship's Phalanx system,15 o while in an autonomous mode, fired several
rounds into another U.S. warship while attempting to down an Iraqi anti-ship
missile.'' In separate incidents during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S.
Patriot systems, 5 2 operating in an autonomous mode, misidentified friendly
aircraft as enemy, leading to the downing of a US F-18 .s. and a British

http://www.popsci.com/blog-network/zero-moment/end-ai-singularity-sci-fis-faith-based-initiative

("Vinge believed [the singularity] would appear by 2023, or 2030 at the absolute latest.").
145. This of course includes Isaac Asimov's classic I, Robot short story series, which developed
the three science fiction laws of robotics and a host of creative works that followed. See ISAAC
AsIMov, I, ROBOT (1950); see also Raymond August, Corpus Juris Roboticum, 8 COMPUTER L.J.
375, 381 (1988) (discussing Asimov's three laws of robotics). These include the Terminator movie
series, in which Skynet, a computer run defense network, becomes self-aware and attempts to wipe
out the human race. See TERMINATOR (Hamdale Film Corp. 1984).
146. See supra Part I (discussing the difficulty of defining autonomy).
147. See infra Part V.
148. See infra Section IIB; THALES, supranote 127.
149. See id. Humans do control these systems, but that control functionally means the ability to
turn off a system after an untoward engagement, not the ability to prevent the engagement from
occurring. Id. at 33.
150. ICRC REPORT, supra note 24, at 65.
151. BERNARD ROSTKER, DEP'T OF DEF., ENVIRONMENTAL EXPosURE REPORT: DEPLETED
URANIUM IN THE GULF (II), http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/duii/duiitabh.htm (last updated Dec. 13,

2000).
152. ICRC REPORT, supra note 24, at 72.
153. Neil Tweedie, US Fighter Shot Down by Patriot Missile, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 4, 2003),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/142663 1/US-fighter-shot-down-by-Pat
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Tornado, 5 4 killing the crews of both.155

And, in 2007 a South African

automatic cannon malfunctioned during a demonstration, killing nine
soldiers and wounding fourteen others.' 6
Refusing to acknowledge the existence of LAWS, and that while there
have been untoward outcomes, there haven't been many, is a form of
avoidance enabled by the red herring of future, fully autonomous killer

robots. 157 This is not only problematic in and of itself but also in terms of
advancing the discussion. Moreover, the inability or refusal to acknowledge
extant systems capable of selecting and engaging targets without human
'

intervention makes it that much more difficult to consider the sizeable "grey
area" of semi-autonomous weapons."5
C Semi-Autonomous Weapons
As has been discussed, the definition of autonomous weapons is

predicated on systems that select and engage targets without human
intervention; engage meaning to fire or to launch.' 59 Thus, where a human
being pushes the proverbial red button or squeezes a trigger, the weapons
system is not autonomous,'16 0 but where the weapons system initiates
launching or firing, it is autonomous, at in least in regard to the function of

riot-missile.html (describing the incident by which a U.S. Army Patriot missile system shot down a
U.S. F-18 warplane, killing the pilot, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Nathan White).
154. RAF

Tornado

Downed

by

US

Missile,

BBC

NEWS

(Mar.

23,

2003),

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2877349.stm (describing the incident by which a U.S. Army
Patriot missile system shot down a Royal Air Force Tornado, killing the two crew members, Flight
Lieutenants Kevin Main and David Williams).
155. See Tweedie, supra note 153.

156. Noah Schactman, Robot Cannon Kills 9, Wounds 14, WIRED (Oct.

18, 2007),

http://www.wired.com/2007/10/robot-cannon-ki/ (describing the cannon as automatic, because it
"pick[ed] out targets" but a human needed to pull the trigger). While that may have been the
intended design, for whatever reason the cannon was able to fire five-hundred 35 mm cannon shells.
Id. Humans made heroic but unsuccessful attempts to stop the cannon, but ultimately it stopped
firing because it exhausted its ammunition supply. Id.
157. See supra Section II.A; see, e.g., Angela Kane, Killer Robots and the Rule of Law,
WORLDPOST (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/A-View-from-the-United-Nations/killer-robots-and-the-rul_b_3599657.html ("Some argue that since autonomous weapons have not

been deployed, it is premature to take action.").
158. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 116 and accompanying text; see also John Lesix, Comment, The Case for

RegulatingFully Autonomous Weapons, 124 YALE L. J. 1309, 1310-11 (2015).
160. See Lesix, supra note 159, at 1311.
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engagement.161

The question then becomes what to make of systems where a human
engages, but the weapons system refines or even changes the target while in
flight? Under the DoD policy these are semi-autonomous weapons systems,

defined as:
A weapon system that, once activated, is intended to only engage
individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected
by a human operator. This includes:

Semi-autonomous weapon systems that employ autonomy for
engagement-related functions including, but not limited to,
acquiring, tracking, and identifying potential targets; cueing
potential targets to human operators; prioritizing selected targets;

timing of when to fire; or providing terminal guidance to home in
on selected targets, provided that human control is retained over the

decision to select individual targets and specific target groups for
engagement.1 6 2
A number of types of systems fall under this definition.1 63 Among the

least problematic are systems like the Boomerang acoustic gunshot
detector.1 64 During an armed conflict knowing the origin of direct fire, such
as a sniper shooting at an army patrol, is, obviously, critically important to
that patrol. Yet quite often in armed conflict it can be quite clear that one or
more combatants are shooting, but it is often unclear where exactly they are

located. This problem is even more pronounced in an urban environment
where sounds, including those from gunfire, reverberate.

Against this

backdrop is the Boomerang system, which uses acoustic sensors to identify
the origins of even a single gunshot.1 6 5 There are several versions of the

161. See generally Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 25 (discussing certain differences between
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons systems).
162. DoD DIRECTIVE, supra note 110.
163. See Gui Marie Del Prado, These Weapons Can Find a Target All by Themselves-And
Researchers Are Terrified, TECH INSIDER (July 30, 2015), http://www.techinsider.io/whichartificially-intelligent-semi-autonomous-weapons-exist-2015-7.
164. See Boomerang III, RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/boomerang/

(last visited Oct. 27, 2016).
165. See id. When a shot is detected, Boomerang immediately announces it; for example: "[S]hot.
two o'clock. 400 meters." Id.; see also Spc. Samuel Soza, Shooter-Detection 'Boomerangs'
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Boomerang for use on vehicles, at guard towers, and even on individual

soldiers.' 66 In one of the vehicle variants, the Boomerang may be connected
to a weapons system, such as a machine gun.1 67 The Boomerang identifies
the source of the sniper fire in less than a second, and the machine gun is

automatically traversed and adjusted to aim at the point of acoustic origin.1 68
There, the machine contributions to this integrated system stop, and the

human involvement functionally begins.1 69 It is a soldier who verifies that
the machine gun is in fact pointed at the sniper.1 70 The soldier can observe
what is (or isn't) near the sniper and make the decision whether to fire the
machine gun.171 Thus the Boomerang is an example of a semi-autonomous
weapons system.1 7 2 The Boomerang does not engage targets, the human

does.1 73 But the Boomerang employs autonomy to acquire and identify
potential targets that are cued to a human operator.1 74
Also included in the definition of semi-autonomous weapons and
illustrating the delineation challenges are fire-and-forget or lock-on-afterlaunch homing missiles. '" These are munitions, such as missiles, that can

Helping in Iraq, U.S. ARMY (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.army.mil/article/32029/.
166. See Boomerang III, supra note 164; see also Boomerang Warrior-X, RAYTHEON,
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/boomerangwarriorx/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
167. See generally Boomerang III, supra note 164 (explaining that the "Boomerang is easily

integrated with options such as the Boomerang Situation Awareness System and third-party
systems").
168. See id.; Mike Hanlon, Vehicle-Mounted Acoustic Sniper Detection System, NEW ATLAS
(Aug. 27, 2005), http://newatlas.com/go/4497/.
169. Cf Hanlon, supra note 168 (describing how once the Boomerang detects the enemy shooter's
position, "[t]he system resets for subsequent shot detection").
170. See generally Paul Scharre, Autonomous Weapons and OperationalRisk, CTR. FOR NEW AM.
SEcuRITY 5 (Feb. 2016), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196288/CNASAutonomous-weapons-

operational-risk.pdf [hereinafter Operational Risk] (explaining that semi-autonomous weapons
require "a human in the loop to authorize each engagement").
171. See id.; Boomerang III, supra note 164.
172. See Boomerang III, supra note 164.

173. See id.
174. See id. Similarly, consider advances in fire control technology that "turn[] an average
shooter into a deadly sniper in a matter of minutes." See Bacon, supra note 137, at 13. A computer
processor attached to a rifle calculates offset and lead and generates an aiming dot on which the
soldier orients the weapon and fires. Id. While this technology is currently being used by and for
snipers-a small group of specialized military members-the goal is to incorporate the technology
into the weapons used by regular soldiers. Id. The results, at least with the snipers, have been a
significant increase in accuracy, which should aid in lessening collateral harm to civilians. Id.
175. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
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be used on the ground,1 76 in the air,17 or in water.1' A human operator fires

or launches the missile at an intended target or in the general direction of
several potential targets.1 79 Once fired, a panoply of different guidance
systems initiate and they, not the human operator,8 o adjust the missile's path

in flight.' 8

In the air, that can mean missile flight times of over thirty

82

At sea, ships and submarines fire torpedoes that run for

seconds.

minutes.' 83 And during this flight or run time, the missile or torpedo,
through its guidance mechanisms, selects, refines, prioritizes and then
engages the target.1 84
Semi-autonomous systems, or whatever we choose to call them,
represent the fault lines in the LAWS discussion and pose some of the

hardest challenges in terms of definitions and where and how to potentially

176. Javelin Weapon System: Man-Portable Guided Weapon System, RAYTHEON,
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/javelin/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
177. AMRAAM: Modern, Versatile and Proven, RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.com/
capabilities/products/amraam/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
178. See AGM/RGM/UGM-84 Harpoon Missile, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/history/

products/agm-84d-harpoon-missile.page (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
179. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.

180. Contrast, for example, a TOW missile, which is a fly-by-wire, anti-tank missile used by
Armies. See TOW Weapon System, RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/
towfamily/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). An individual soldier operating on the ground or from
inside a vehicle or helicopter fires a TOW missile, and the soldier then corrects the missile's

trajectory in flight through adjustments which are relayed from the firing platform to the in-flight
missile via radio frequency. Id.
181. See id. The guidance systems may include, among other capabilities, internal navigation,

passive, active, and altimeter radars, and the use of infrared imaging. See id.
182. See, e.g., Brimstone Advanced Anti-Armour Missile, United Kingdom, ARMY TECH.,
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/brimstone/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). For example,
during that thirty-second period, the sensors of the United Kingdom's missile, Brimstone, identify
where the target's optimal impact point is. Id.
183. See generally Operational Risk, supra note 170; Submarine Periscopes and Approach
Techniques, FLEET SUBMARINE, http://www.fleetsubmarine.com/periscope.htnl (last visited Oct. 11,

2016).
184. What if after the plane, ship, or submarine fires this type of munition, the firing platform is
destroyed or communications between the platform and the munition are lost? The DoD Policy
suggests that this would transform a semi-autonomous weapons system into an autonomous one.
See DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 110. As a result, the policy states that "weapon systems that are
onboard or integrated with unmanned platforms must be designed such that, in the event of degraded

or lost communications, the system does not autonomously select and engage individual targets or
specific target groups that have not been previously selected by an authorized human operator." Id.
at 3.
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Yet these systems aren't being discussed,1 86

regulate. 18 5

at least in part

because The Campaign frames the problem as the "numerous ethical, legal,
moral, policy, technical and other concerns with fully autonomous
weapons."'

7

According to The Campaign, these weapons would, in the

future, "be able to choose and fire on targets on their own, without human
intervention." 18

This view of the problem is flawed on various levels.1 89 As

this article has discussed, there are no fully autonomous weapons.190
Weapons systems with autonomy in the critical function of selecting and
engaging targets without human intervention are not a looming Rubicon, but
one crossed decades ago. 191 To fully understand the odd duality of The
Campaign being so successful in bringing attention to LAWS while

obfuscating the international discussions that followed requires
consideration of The Campaign's primary source documents, Losing
Humanity and the SR Report.

III. CRITIQUING

THE CAMPAIGN'S SOURCE DOCUMENTS: LOSING HUMANITY

& THE SR REPORT
A. Moral Panic

Both of The Campaign's foundational documents, Losing Humanity and
the SR Report, utilize moral panic to engender attention and support for their

cause. 192 The classic description of moral panic is:
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature
is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass

185. See Prado, supra note 163.

186. Id.
187. Learn, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/learn/ (last

visited Feb. 16, 2016).
188. Id.
189. See Prado, supra note 163; Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Out of the Loop
Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARv. NAT'L. SEC. J. 231, 243

(2013).
190. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
191. See ICRC REPORT, supra note 24.
192. See SR Report, supra note 3; Losing Humanity, supra note 8.
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media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops,

politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited
experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are
evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears,

submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.'
The two source documents employ moral panic to very different extents:

the very title of Losing Humanity includes the term "killer robots," while the
SR Report avoids the term "killer" but opts for "robot" and uses hyperbolic
language throughout the report itself.1 94 To be clear, the moral panic begins
with the use of the word robot, with or without the "killer" label.' 95 And the
use of the word robot was-of course-deliberate, prompting images which
elicit fear or revulsion in a way that terms like "LAWS" or "weapons

system" do not.1 96

193. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEViLS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND THE
ROCKERS 1 (1972); see also Sheldon Ungar, Moral Panic Versus the Risk Society: The Implications
of the Changing Sites ofSocial Anxiety, 52 BRIT. J. Soc. 271 (2001) (comparing moral panic with the
potential political catastrophes of a risk society).
194. See SR Report, supra note 3; Losing Humanity, supra note 8.
195. See infra Section III.A.
196. See Norri Kageki, An Uncanny Mind: MasahiroMori on the Uncanny Valley and Beyond,
IEEE SPECTRUM (June 12, 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/humanoids/anuncanny-mind-masahiro-mori-on-the-uncanny-valley (describing the evolution of the idea that
"people would react with revulsion to humanlike robots, whose appearance resembled, but did not
quite replicate, that of a real human"). This is known as the "uncanny valley," the idea that humans
find inanimate objects aesthetically pleasing when they look similar but not too similar to human
beings. Id. As the theory is plotted along a graph, human reaction to human-like things is
increasingly positive, until the point where an inanimate object is "too" lifelike, leading to the graph
plummeting to reflect fear and revulsion. Id. This precipitous drop is the "uncanny valley." Id. But
see Joel Garreau, Bots on the Ground, WASH. POST (May 6, 2007), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/05/AR2007050501009.html
(describing the
attachment U.S. Service members develop towards robotic systems that do not resemble humans).
Garreau explains how a U.S. Army Colonel canceled the remainder of a test in which a five-foot

long robot modeled on stick insects was used to locate mines. Id. The robot located the mine by
stepping on and detonating the mine, which would blow off one of the robot's pneumatic actuatorsor in anthropomorphic terms, its leg-after which the robot continued, per its programming, on a
route to locate more mines. Id. The robot had blown off all but one "leg," which it was using to
drag itself forward, prompting the colonel to call the test "inhumane." Id. Similarly, U.S. service

members have awarded promotions and awards to machines, primarily "bots" used to search for
improvised explosive devices. Id. The bots become "part of the team" and receive a name, and the
soldiers "get upset when anything happens to one of the team." Id.
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1.

Losing Humanity

There is no ambiguity as to why Losing Humanity includes the term
"killer robots" in its title.1 97 As a member of Human Rights Watch (and
global coordinator for The Campaign) explained:
We put killer robots in the title of our report to be provocative and

get attention. . . . It's shameless campaigning and advocacy, but
we're trying to be really focused on what the real life problems are,
and killer robots seemed to be a good way to begin the dialogue.' 98
That statement is certainly correct as to being provocative and, with that,
gaining attention.1 99 But evoking nightmarish images from science fiction
movies and technology, which do not now and may never exist, is the
opposite of focusing on real life problems. And a provocative title hardly
seems a good way to begin a dialogue, or a reasoned one anyway.
The report itself utilizes moderate and reasonable language,200 so there
may be a temptation to view the handful of instances where it uses the term

"killer robots" simply as clever and effective marketing.

And it is. But

using "killer robots" comes at a cost: provoking people to envision a
potential, future harm makes it that much harder for Losing Humanity to
acknowledge and explain that autonomous weapons have long been in use,
and with little controversy. 201
This in turn leads to exempting extant

weapons systems by labeling them as automated or automatic and not
autonomous, despite their capability to select and engage targets without
human intervention.2 02

Arguing that the international community should now ban certain
systems that have been used for decades was always going to be a challenge,
but the use of "killer robots" exacerbated that challenge. A year later, the
UN Special Rapporteur followed suit.203

197. See Eveleth, supra note 32.

198. See id.
199. See id.
200. As discussed infra Section II.A.2, the reverse is true for the SR Report, which, while using
the slightly more measured lethal autonomous robots, is replete with melodramatic hyperbole.
201. See supra Section II.A.
202. Id.; Losing Humanity, supranote 8, at 9.
203. See infra Section II.A.2.
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2.

SR Report

In 2013, the UN's Human Rights Council published a report by the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions that
focused on "lethal autonomous robotics and the protection of life." 2 While
the UN's office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights contends that
"[t]he Special Rapporteur is guided primarily by international legal
standards," 205 the report reflects something very different. Rather than legal

standards, the SR Report uses redolent language to generate both interest and
urgency.2 06 As with Losing Humanity, using emotional pulls as a "hook" is
not problematic per se, provided that what follows is some combination of
law and fact.207 But the SR Report employs moral panic as a means and an
end.2 08

In self-serving (and sustaining) fashion, the report introduces

ominous and foreboding language and then claims the concerns that arise as
a basis for a moratorium.20 9 While Losing Humanity employs vague and
unapplied terminology to skip over conceptual gaps, the SR Report confuses
and conflates.2 10

The SR Report utilizes the term Lethal Autonomous Robots or LARs.21 1
While certainly not the first to use that term,212 the report's use of the word
"robots" is not helpful to the discussion. 213 The word "robot" is ambiguous,
and subject to debate and interpretation,2 14 including "whether a device must
204. SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 1.
205. International Standards, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTs. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Executions/Pages/InternationalStandards.aspx (last visited Oct. 30,

2016).
206. See infra Section III.C.2; see, e.g., SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 95 ("[T]he strength of the
intuitive reactions that the use of LARs is likely to elicit cannot be ignored.").
207. See infra Section III.A.
208. See SR Report, supra note 3.
209. See infra Section III.C.2; see, e.g., SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 76 ("Robots have no moral
agency and as a result cannot be held responsible in any recognizable way if they cause deprivation
of life that would normally require accountability if humans had made the decisions. Who, then, is
to bear the responsibility?").
210. See supra Sections II.A.1-2.
211. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Thurnher, No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully
Autonomous Targeting, 67 JOINT FORCES Q., no. 4, 2012, at 77 (2012), http://ndupress.
ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-67/JFQ-67_77-84_Thurnher.pdf.
213. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
214. Rain Livoja, Emerging Technologies of Warfare, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 11 (2016); see also ICRC REPORT, supra note 24, at 61 (quoting a group of
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have some meaningful degree of autonomy in order to be deemed a

robot." 215 The words "autonomy" and "robot" each depend on how the other
is defined, creating a needless (and unhelpful) etymological loop. 216 Using
the term "robots" does, however, provides a useful base upon which the SR

Report can later histrionically heap.217 To do so, the report first incorrectly
claims terminology equivalence. 2 1

The SR Report contends that there is a "widely used definition (endorsed
inter alia by both the United States Department of Defense and Human
Rights Watch)" of LARs.21 9 In support, the SR Report cites to the DoD
Directive on Autonomy in Weapons, but the directive does not use the term

robot or robotics.2 20
The SR Report is correct that there is a shared focus on "weapon
systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further
intervention by a human operator." 2 2 '

But the report then problematically

claims that "[t]he important element is that the robot has an autonomous
'choice' regarding selection of a target and the use of lethal force." 222
The use of the word "choice" following the word autonomous is either a
non sequitur, fearmongering, or both.223 "Choice" suggests arbitrarinessthat a system could, after processing the same data at different times,

scientists' summary of "what might be considered as robotic military systems"). The implication of
"what might be" is that there is no consensus. ICRC REPORT, supra note 24, at 61. From a

paragraph-long summary we learn that most robots are mobile and do not carry human operators, but
neither of those aspects are essential features of a robot. See id. The summary discusses the
spectrum of autonomy, and notes that, to be a robot, a device cannot depend entirely on a human
operator. Id. The resulting broad and varying range of what may or may not properly be considered
robotic is why adding to the already confused discussion on autonomy is not helpful. See id.
215. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
216. The U.N. Special Rapporteur has continually tried to keep LARs and the term "robot" in the
discussion. See Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
ArbitraryExecutions, 1 133, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/36 (Apr. 1, 2014). In 2014, the SR Report reads
as if LAWs and LARs are interchangeable. Id.
217. At least Losing Humanity has acknowledged the rationale behind the use of the "killer
robots" language. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8; see also Eveleth, supra note 32.
218. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
219. SR Report, supra note 3, 138.
220. Id. (referring to DOD DIRECTIVE); see DoD DIRECTIVE, supra note 110.
221. SR Report, supra note 3, 138.

222. Id.
223. See Choice, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/choice (last
visited Oct. 11, 2016) (defining choice as "the act of picking or deciding between two or more
possibilities" or "the opportunity or power to make a decision").
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"choose" to take different actions in one instance versus another.22 4 This is

not correct. "As a fundamental principle . . . the actions of a program or
robot are bounded by the information it has, the amount of time available for
computation and the limitations of its algorithms-thus, the independence

...

is fixed by the designers." 225 This suggests that a weapons system could,

at separate times,
differently.22 6

receive the

same data but "choose"

to respond

The SR Report contends that "[b]ased on current experiences of [armed
unmanned aerial systems], there is a reason to believe that States will inter
alia seek to use LARs for targeted killing." 2 27 The claim-that "current
experiences" with armed UAS support a belief on the future use of LAWS-

is both illogical and incorrect. 228 It's illogical because there is no connection
between the two weapons systems: 229 that armed UAS have been employed
over the last decade doesn't suggest anything about the development and use
of LAWS.230 It's incorrect because there have been over thirty years of state
practice in which LAWS haven't been used for targeted killings, and in the
United States, there is a written policy on autonomous weapons systems that
prohibits "selecting humans as targets."231 Of course state practices can
224. See id.
225. DSB REPORT, supranote 71, at 11 (referring to Simon's Law of Bounded Rationality).
226. The SR Report makes the statement about robots making choices in paragraph thirty-eight.
SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 38. Six paragraphs later, the report claims that popular culture "often
assigns human-like attributes to robots." Id. ¶ 44. Claiming that robots make choices is an example
of this type of assignment. The SR Report reads as if it was written by several people who have
quite different views on the topic. In one paragraph it talks of robots choosing, but in another it
refers to robotic "decisions" using the word in quotes, reflecting that robots aren't actually deciding.
Id.. ¶¶ 38-39. And the report quite correctly states robots do not have free will or moral agency
while later claiming the world order ending issues these systems create "will, quite literally, be taken
out of human hands." Id. ¶ 110.

227. Id.¶ 47.
228. Id.; see infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.

229. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
230. See Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 25, at 8; see also infra note 231-232.
231. DOD DIR., supra note 110, at 3. While the SR Report assumes the inevitability of LAWS

development, there are policy-imposed limitations from recent history that show the opposite. See,
e.g., Helicopters, COMBAT AIRCRAFT, http://www.combataircraft.com/en/Military-Aircraft/
Helicopter/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). Armed helicopters have existed for over fifty years, yet in
the U.S., police helicopters have never been weaponized. Robert Meisner, Advanced Simulation And
Computing Program Plan, NNSA (Oct. 2008), https://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsal

inlinefiles/ASCFY09_PPlan.pdf.

And, more apt to the LAWS discussion, the U.S. could have

made its nuclear response process quicker by assigning more functions to computers. Instead the
U.S. policy relied on less efficient humans to launch nuclear-equipped missiles. See, e.g., SR
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change and policies can be modified, but the SR Report ignores both state

practice and policy concerning LAWS while asserting (but not supporting) a
nonexistent correlation between the employment of armed UAS and
LAWS.

232

The SR Report acknowledges that "[t]he use of emotive terms such as
'killer robots' may well be criticized." 2 33 Yet according to the SR Report,

"the strength of the intuitive reactions that the use of LARs is likely to elicit
cannot be ignored." 234 Thus, the report disingenuously claims that the
reaction to a term the SR Report introduced cannot be ignored. The use of
"killer robots" proves the rhetorical floor. For no discernible reason other
than to engender moral panic, the SR Report notes that LAWS have been
"depicted as treating people like 'vermin', who are 'exterminated."' 235 if

that were not enough, the SR Report claims that such descriptions "conjure
up the image of LARs as some kind of mechanized pesticide."236
While Losing Humanity and the SR Report successfully leverage moral
panic in marketing terms, its usage dooms the very discussion it enabled.237
Losing Humanity and the SR Report try to reconcile their futuristic
fearmongering with the long-standing use of LAWS. 238 But generalized
distinctions between automatic and automated, and decision-making as a
loop do not alter the inevitable-a conceptual cul-de-sac of their own
making, brought about by and through the use of the term "killer robots" and

Report, supra note 3. Could those policy choices be changed? Of course. But that they haven't
over such a long period of time suggests that policy choices may be entitled to more deference than
what the SR Report afforded them.
232. While the SR Report in particular reads as if western militaries are preoccupied with the
prospect of utilizing and defending against LAWS, a recent U.S. Army wargame suggests otherwise.
Eric Iverson, Wargame to Examine the Fall of a 'Megacity,' U.S. ARMY (Aug. 18, 2014), http://
www.army.mil/article/131994/Wargame to examine-the-fall of amegacity_/.
The wargame,
named Unified Quest, "examines a variety of feasible mid- to long-range strategic and operational
settings and explores a broad set of ideas about future conflict." Id. Set in the year 2035, the
wargame featured "a city of more than 10 million people . . . in a state of crisis plagued by
insurgency, internal corruption and struck by a natural disaster in the form of a major flood." Id.
Killer robots, however, did not play a role in the wargame. See id. The U.S. Army apparently
believes it is far more likely that it will be fighting in urban combat in large cities and in the tunnels
and sewers underneath, than with and against robots. See id.
233. SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 95.

234. Id.
235. Id. T 96.
236. Id.
237. See generally SR Report, supra note 3; Losing Humanity, supranote 8.
238. See supra Section II.A.
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discussions of full autonomy.
B.

Conceptual Paradoxes
1.

Losing Humanity

Losing Humanity's definitional confusion begins in the second sentence
of the report. 239 The report contends that "[s]ome military and robotics
experts have predicted that 'killer robots'-fully autonomous weapons that
could select and engage targets without human intervention-could be
developed within 20 to 30 years."240 Moving beyond the points that fully
autonomous weapons do not exist and that weapons systems that select and
engage targets without human intervention have existed for decades, the
report forecasts potential harm from potential systems-some 20 to 30 years
in the future.24 1 Yet in trying to explain what it is about these potential
systems that would be so problematic, Losing Humanity has to distinguish
them from current weapons systems.242 While that would be a challenging
enough undertaking, Losing Humanity also tries to include some of these
current weapons systems within the ambit of future worrisome systems.2 43
This is a logic circle that Losing Humanity (nor anyone for that matter)
cannot square.

The Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Clinic's
efforts to avoid the conceptual corner into which they painted themselves in

Losing Humanity begin at the outset of the report, in a section on definitions
and terminology. 244

The section divides robotic weapons into three

categories but never clearly defines their parameters. 245
are:

Those categories

239. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 1.

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 3. Or, alternatively, the report should explain why concerns over decades-old
autonomous weapons only manifested themselves in 2012. See id.

243. Id. at 1.
244. See id. at 2.
245. Id. Losing Humanity also refers to levels of autonomy.

See id. at 2-3.

As discussed,

thinking autonomy in levels is an unhelpful taxonomy given the dynamic nature of functions within
.

a system that operate concurrently and sequentially, and with varied allocations to computers or
humans. See supra Part
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[1] Human-in-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and

deliver force only with a human command;
[2] Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets
and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can

override the robots' actions; and
[3] Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of
selecting targets and delivering force without any human input or
interaction.24 6

The report fails to provide even a single example of weapons systems in
which humans are in-, on-, or out-of-the-loop, which is telling of the
categorization's lack of utility.247 The report then contends that "[t]he term
'fully autonomous weapon' refers to both out-of-the-loop weapons [category

3 above] and those that allow a human on the loop [category 2 above], but
that are effectively out-of-the-loop weapons because the supervision is so
limited." 248
Thus some, but not all, human-on-the-loop weapons should be
considered fully autonomous. 2 49 But the only criterium Losing Humanity

provides to subdivide human-on-the-loop weapons is whether the human
supervision is "so limited" that that the weapons "are effectively out-of-theloop weapons." 25 0 Again, the report provides no examples of weapons
systems on either side of the "so limited" line, nor does it define or explain
'

what constitutes "so limited" human supervision.25

Having defined, however generally, in-, on-, and out-of-the-loop at the
beginning of the report, Losing Humanity curiously fails to apply or even

mention the terms in the substantive chapter discussing current autonomous
weapons.252 Instead, the report uses the term "automatic weapons defense
systems," a term omitted from the definitions and terminology section.253

246. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 2.

247. Id.
248. Id. The report then reiterates that "[f]ully autonomous weapons, which are the focus of this
report, do not yet exist." Id.
249. See generally id.

250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 6-13.
253. See id. at 2, 9.

40

False Rubicons

[Vol. 44: 1, 2016]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

a.

Automatic Weapons Defense Systems

The first substantive section of the report is entitled "Unmanned Robots
and the Evolution Toward Fully Autonomous Weapons."254 In this section,
the report attempts to account for the long-standing use of a number of
weapons systems capable of selecting and engaging targets without human
intervention.25 5 Under the heading "Automatic Weapons Defense Systems,"
the report lists several systems, including the U.S. Phalanx and C-RAM

systems, Israel's Iron Dome, and Germany's Mantis.25 6
The report claims that "[t]hese systems are designed to sense an
incoming munition, such as a missile or rocket, and to respond automatically
to neutralize the threat."257 This description is disingenuous by omission.2 58
The defense systems are designed to sense and respond not to munitions, but

threats. 25 9 Threats come in a variety of forms including but certainly not
limited to missiles and rockets. As the website for the Phalanx explains, it's
also designed to "be used against helicopters and high-speed surface craft at
sea." 260 And, where the Phalanx successfully targets a helicopter or surface

craft, the likely results are injury or death to the human pilots and crew.261
While ignoring this, the report contains the U.S. Navy's description of
the Phalanx as "the only deployed close-in weapon system capable of
autonomously performing its own search, detect, evaluation, track, engage
and kill assessment functions. 2 62 Indeed the report acknowledges that

"[t]hese weapon defense systems have a significant degree of autonomy,"
but they "fall short of being fully autonomous." 263 Instead, the report claims
such weapons systems "can better be classified as automatic. 2 64

254. Id. at 6.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 9-11.
257. Id. at 9.
258. See infra note 381 and accompanying text.
259. Cf Convention on Cluster Munitions, UNITED

NATIONS

OFF.

GENEVA,

http://

www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/F27A2B84309EOC5AC12574F70036Fl76?OpenDo
cument (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
260. Phalanx, supra note 126.

261. Id.
262. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 10 (emphasis added).

263. Id. at 12. This is true but not particularly helpful, because all weapons systems fall short of
being fully autonomous. See id.
264. Id.
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The reason Losing Humanity doesn't discuss the fact that defensive

weapons systems target threats with human operators and crews, in addition
to munitions, is because of the untenable place such acknowledgement takes
the argument. The proposal is a ban of autonomous systems-if a weapons

system is automatic, it's not covered. 265

And while Losing Humanity

discusses how some extant weapons should be included in the ban, it can't

articulate which ones.266 So it's far more palatable that automatic defensive
weapons be thought of as only targeting things-inanimate objects like
missiles and rockets and not people, but it's not accurate.2 67
And while the difference between automated and autonomous is
significant in Losing Humanity, it's four pages into a four-and-a-half-page

section where the term automatic is generally described-not even
defined.268 The report uses Professor Sharkey's example of an automatic
"robot arm painting a car," 2 69 in contrast to an autonomous robot, which

functions "in open and unstructured environments." 270 As previously
discussed, this description is useful as a means to understand the differences
in machine complexity but not to categorize where an individual weapons
system is properly placed on the automatic-automated-autonomous
spectrum.27 1 Moreover, this shifts the focus to overall categorization when
the most important consideration is whether the weapons system selects and
engages targets without further human intervention.2 7 2

It is challenging to reconcile Losing Humanity's definitional focus on
in-, on-, or out-of-the-loop and the substantive portion on automatic
weapons defense systems. Nowhere in that later substantive section are the
terms in-, on-, or out-of-the-loop used, nor is there any discussion about how
much or what kind of human supervision is required before an on-the-loop

system is considered out-of-the-loop or fully autonomous.27 3
The report seems to obviously include, while not admitting as much, at

265. See generally Losing Humanity, supranote 8.

266. See id. at 46.
267. See id.
268. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 9.
269. Id. (quoting Neil Sharkey, Automating Warfare: Lessons Learnedfrom the Drones, 21 J. L.

INFO. & Sci. 140, 141 (2012)).
270. Id. at 12.
271. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
273. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 9.
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least some automatic weapons defense systems as equivalent to fully
27
autonomous.274
The section on automatic weapons states that "[h]uman
involvement, when it exists at all, is limited to accepting or overriding the

computer's plan of action in a matter of seconds."2 7 5

Presumably, a lack of human involvement or one limited to a matter of
seconds would be included in the "too limited" supervision, but the report

fails to apply its own definitions and terminology. 276 Having not used in-,
on-, or out-of-the-loop descriptions in the section on automatic weapons
defense systems, the following section begins with "[o]ther unmanned
systems that currently retain humans in or on the loop are also precursors to
fully autonomous weapons." 2 77 Using "other" presumably means in addition

to the systems just discussed-automatic weapons defense systems.27 8
Why is there an aversion to referring to automatic weapons defense
systems as in-, on-, or out-of-the-loop, as well as an aversion to identifying
how limited the human supervision must be to qualify a system as out of the
loop? 279 There are at least two reasons for these omissions: (1) the in-, on-,
and out-of-the-loop categorizations and the "so limited" time delineation
aren't functionally useful,28 0 and (2) any specificity in applying either would
yield the pragmatically untenable result of current weapons being included
within the ambit of a desired ban against future "killer robots."281 That
Losing Humanity fails to include this information, and more importantly,

why it really couldn't include it are critically important manifestations of a
flawed conceptual framework. That framework has migrated to the SR
Report and helps explain, at least in part, The Campaign's lack of success at
28 2
the CCW.

274. See id.
275. Id. Elsewhere in the section, the report refers to automatic weapons defense systems as
operating with "limited intervention from humans." Id. at 12. The report fails to discuss whether
this limited intervention is above or below the "so limited" line the report itself established to
distinguish an out-of-the-loop weapon. See id.
276. See supra Losing Humanity, note 273 and accompanying text.
277. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 13.

278. Id.
279. See supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text.
280. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 2.

281. Id. at 1.
282. See supra,notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
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b. Lack ofFunctional Utility

The first reason for Losing Humanity's lack of specificity (and
examples) is that the in-, on-, and out-of-the-loop categorization is of
minimal utility beyond its use as a generalized descriptor of human
It oversimplifies the
involvement with machines in one spectrum. 283
complexity of autonomy, as evidenced by its lack of applied utility.2 84 How
should one categorize a torpedo or missile that is fired by human action but

then performs a number of active and passive functions designed to identify,
prioritize, and engage a target? 285 Aspects of such weapons fit under the
Losing Humanity definition for in- and on- and out-of-the-loop.2 86
Similarly, a number of current weapons select and engage a target without
human intervention, though a human can override or abort a launch or

firing.287 Under Losing Humanity's definitions, such a system would be both
a human on and out of the loop weapon.288
c.

PracticalReasons

The second reason why Losing Humanity fails to provide meaningful
specificity is that if the report clarified the automatic weapons defense
systems-in which human involvement is so limited as to render them "fully
autonomous"-these systems would be caught up in the report's call for

ban.289 That would mean calling on countries to ban not just future,
undeveloped weapons systems, but any number of current weapons systems,
which for decades have played an important role in the militaries of over
thirty countries.2 90

283. Losing Humanity is by no means the first or only report to utilize in-, on-, and out-of-the-loop
to describe weapons systems. See, e.g., DSB REPORT, supra note 71. The DSB REPORT uses the

terms at several points in its 2012 report, but only as a descriptor, not as means of differentiation. Id.
The DoD directive does not contain a single reference to in-, on-, or out-of-the-loop.
DIRECTIVE, supra note 110.
284. See, e.g., Scharre & Horowitz, supranote 25, at 8.
285. See, e.g., id.
286. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 2.
287. See, e.g., Scharre & Horowitz, supranote 25, at 12-13.
288. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 2.

DOD

289. Id.; see infra Section III.C.l.
290. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8. And while money is not and should not be the primary
consideration by which the international community makes decisions, there is a tremendous sunk
cost in autonomous weapons. Considering the number of countries which have utilized them for
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The report's authors know such a request is not realistic

2 91

and that it

raises questions for which there do not appear to be satisfying answers.2 92
For example, if the limited nature of the Phalanx's human supervision
qualifies the system as the functional equivalent of a fully autonomous

weapon, which should be banned, considerable explanation would be
necessary.293

If the Phalanx, which moves from threat detection to

294
'tekn
o
engagement with lethal force in less than three seconds, isn't the kind of
system the report envisions as involving too limited human supervision, one
wonders what system would, and why the Phalanx would be included in the

report.295
The report ducks any meaningful characterization of automatic weapons

defense systems.29 6 Instead, the report claims that "further study" of
automatic weapons is warranted.29 7 It is puzzling that weapons systems that
have been in existence for decades require further study, yet Losing
Humanity has no difficulty in reaching conclusions about future,
298
undeveloped weapons systems.
While reaching a similar conceptual dead
end, the SR Report does so through a different, albeit equally vague and
contradictory path.29 9

2.

SR Report

Similar to Losing Humanity, the SR Report paradoxically attempts to
distinguish extant autonomous weapons systems from LARs while
simultaneously including but not specifying some extant weapons systems

decades, the cost of research, development, and fielding these systems is in the billions of dollars.
See id.
291. Consider the enormity of the ban applied to just Phalanx, which is "installed on all U.S. Navy
surface combatant ship classes and on those of 24 allied nations." Phalanx, supranote 126.
292. See infra note 358 and accompanying text.
293. See Phalanx, supra note 126.

294. See

Phalanx

Gatling

Gun

(CIWS),

BOMBSHOCK,

http://www.bombshock.com/

weaponscombat/firearms/phalanx-gatling-gun-ciws.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). Publicly, the
U.S. Navy simply refers to the Phalanx as having a "fast reaction time." MK 15-Phalanx Close-in
Weapons System
(CIWS),
AM.'S
NAVY,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact-display.asp
?cid=2100&tid-487&ct-2 (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
295. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 9.
296. See generally id.

297. Id. at 12.
298. See id. at 6, 16-19 ("[T]he military of the future will be increasingly unmanned.").
299. See infra Section III.A.2.
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as LARs

00

The non sequitur's end result is a detailed call for a moratorium

of systems not explained with anything resembling the specificity needed to
actually implement the called-for moratorium.o'
The SR Report utilizes a form of the in-, on-, and out-of-the-loop

continuum similar to but less useful than the minimal utility of Losing
Humanity's version.

302

Losing Humanity at least generally defined in-, on-,

and out-of-the-loop,3 03 and while unhelpfully vague about where and how to
demarcate between them, identified general categories of weapons systems
that would be included in a ban.304
The SR Report positions armed "robots" at one end of the continuum
based on their "significant human involvement" and because there is "a

human in the loop."305 At the other end of the spectrum are full autonomy
and LARs, where humans are "out of the loop." 306 The resulting continuum
is unworkable as the end, and even the mid-points, are not defined.30 7
The SR Report attempts to anchor the left side of the continuum-"the
human in the loop" end-with "UCAVS," which the report describesas
unmanned combat aerial vehicles, such as the Predator. 308 But what is it
about UCAVs that represents "significant human involvement"?' 09 Perhaps
the significant human involvement is that the Predator launches a missile
while a human pilot, located somewhere else, directs the firing?31 o But
without knowing what significant human involvement means, the left side of

the continuum is untethered.3 11

300. See generally SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 50.
301. See generally id. ¶ 118.

302. Id.¶ 41.
303. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 2.

304. See id. at 2, 46.
305. SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 39.

306. Id. T 41.
307. See generally id.
308. See id. T 26. The SR Report refers to UCAVs as robotic and possessing some measure of
autonomy. Id. ¶ 39. Under the SR Report they are autonomous robots; and in firing missiles, they
are certainly lethal. However, they are also not, because the SR Report claims a LAR has an
autonomous choice "regarding selection of a target and the use of lethal force," which UCAVs do
not have. Id. ¶ 38. Thus, under the SR Report's framework, UCAVs both are and are not LARs.
See id.

309. Id.¶ 39.
310. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
311. And the UCAV is a relatively easy example. See supra notes 305-09 and accompanying
text. What about the "fire-and-forget" systems, which require a human to fire, but after launch the
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The other end of the continuum, humans out-of-the-loop,

is full

autonomy and LARs.312 Yet, as discussed, there are no fully autonomous
systems (and may never be)." The SR Report acknowledges the former
point, that "robots with full lethal autonomy have not yet been deployed." 3 14

So the right end of the continuum is unbounded and may not ever exist. 315
The SR Report then attempts to mark and parse out mid-points of the

continuum and differentiate between types of on-the-loop systems.316 This
only reinforces that the in-, on-, and out-of-the-loop characterization is of
minimal utility beyond as a general descriptor of one spectrum of
autonomy.3 17
The SR Report discusses "supervised autonomy," where a human is "on

the loop [and] monitors and can override the robot's decisions." 1
While
Losing Humanity spoke of "so limited" human involvement and having only
a "matter of seconds" to override machine action, the SR Report contends
that the decision-making speed of robots is "often measured in
nanoseconds." 319 It is these unidentified systems where the SR Report
concludes that "humans are de facto out of the loop and the machines thus
effectively constitute LARs." 320 The SR Report does not even attempt to
identify the parameters of when "supervised autonomy" qualifies a weapons
system as a LAR. 32 1 That's because parsing out supervised autonomy by
time is both arbitrary and self-defeating.

weapons system refines or prioritizes which specific target to engage? See SR Report, supra note 3,
¶ 45; see also Ali Mohammadi, Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missile, MIL. TODAY,
http://www.military-today.com/missiles/javelin.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
312. See SR Report, supra note 3, 145.
313. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 2.
314. SR Report, supra note 3,¶45.

315. See id.
316. See id.
317.
318.
319.
320.
ARMY
321.

See generally Scharre & Horowitz, supranote 25, at 17.
SR Report, supra note 3, ¶41.
See id.; Losing Humanity, supranote 8.
See SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 41; see also PatriotMissile Long-Range Air-Defense System,
TECH., http://www.army-technology.com/projects/patriot/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
SR Report, supra note 3, T41.
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a.

Time as a measure ofautonomy

Under the SR Report's approach, certain supervised weapons systemsthose whose decision-making is measured in nano-seconds-are de facto
LARs.32 2 The SR Report doesn't, however, list the systems that would thus
qualify as LARs. 3 23 Instead, the report delineates supervised weapons
systems by decision-making processing time: nano-second decision-making
time equals a de facto LAR.324 How or why that processing time was chosen

is unclear. What about milliseconds? Tenths? A second? Even using nanoseconds, the SR Report never specifies the weapons systems that employ this
decision-making time and are thus subject to the moratorium.325 The
implication of the SR Report is that humans could replicate and even
improve weapons system targeting by playing a more active role. 32 6 This

flies in the face of why current autonomous weapons were developed-to
facilitate the effective engagement of multiple, high-performance, even
supersonic threats within seconds (or milliseconds) because human beings
are not effectively able to do so. 32 7

Consider what a Patriot air defense system does in tracking up to 100
aerial objects up to 60 miles away, and providing intercept missile guidance
data for up to nine missiles to engage up to nine different targets. 328 This
form of complexity occurs in all battlespace mediums-land, sea, and airand there is no question as to machines' advantages over humans in

collecting and evaluating long-range sensor data in time-compressed
environments.329

322. Id.
323. See id. ¶¶ 37-49.
324. Id. T 41.
325. See id.

326. Id. IN 55-56.
327. See SEARAM Anti-Ship Missile Defense System, RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.
com/capabilities/products/searam/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
328. Patriot Missile Long-Range Air-Defence System, ARMY TECH., http://www.armytechnology.com/projects/patriot (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). The Patriot system identifies and
distinguishes between multiple aerial objects, determining altitude, heading, speed, intercept
trajectories, whether the object is manned, and even whether the object is carrying ordinance. See
PEO MISSILES & SPACE, WEAPON SYSTEMS BOOK (2012), https://www.msl.army.mil/
Documents/peoWeaponSystems.pdf; see also Marshall Brain, How Patriot Missiles Work, How
STUFF WORKS (Mar. 28, 2003), http://science.howstuffworks.com/patriot-missile.htin.
329. See, e.g., Stark's Missile System May Have Been Malfunctioning, L.A. TIMES (May 24,
1987), http://articles.1atimes.com/1987-05-24/news/mn-2304_1_missile-atack [hereinafter Stark's
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b.

Automatic vs. Autonomous

'

The SR Report then contends that "[a]utonomous needs to be
distinguished from 'automatic' or 'automated,"' but does not explain why
that needs to occur.330 Similar to Losing Humanity, the SR Report provides
an example that is not a weapons system and thus not particularly useful.33
Resembling Losing Humanity's reference to Professor Sharkey and robotic
car painting, the SR Report describes automatic devices "such as household

appliances
[that] operate within a structured and predictable
environment."3 3 2 These systems are to be distinguished from autonomous
systems, which "can function in an open environment, under unstructured

and dynamic circumstances."33 3

It's hard to determine which household

appliance most closely resembles a weapons system's functions, or the point

of even trying to compare them.33 4 Focusing on the overall categorization of
a weapons system diverts attention from where it should be-on whether
man or machine is performing the critical function of engagement: selecting

Missile]. Consider the examples provided by the U.S.S. Stark and the U.S.S. Vincennes, two U.S.
Navy warships. See id. In 1987, while the U.S.S. Stark was operating in the Persian Gulf, the ship
was struck by two missiles fired by an Iraqi warplane, killing 37 U.S. sailors. Id. Among a host of
contributing factors was that the Phalanx system on the Stark was malfunctioning and thus placed in
a manual mode. Id. Had the Phalanx been operating properly and in autonomous mode, "it was the

only system aboard the Stark that offered a realistic chance of defending the ship because the Iraqi
warplane fired at such close range." Id. In contrast, the following year the captain and crew of the
U.S.S. Vincennes fired a missile at (and downed) what they thought was an Iranian warplane but
was a civilian commercial aircraft, killing 290 passengers and crew. See John Bary & Roger
Charles, Sea of Lies, NEWSWEEK (Jul. 12, 1992), http://www.newsweek.com/sea-lies-200118
[hereinafter Sea ofLies].
The U.S.S. Vincennes incident did not involve an autonomous weapons system. See id.
Instead, it is an example, contrary to Losing Humanity, of humans' limited capacity for judging
certain complex situations. See id.; cf Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 4.
In the case of the Vincennes, among other problems, the captain was fixated on Iranian
gunboats some distance away. See Sea of Lies, supra. The Vincennes crew misinterpreted accurate
data from systems on the Vincennes concerning the plane. Id. One lesson from the Vincennes is the
need to constantly asses and improve how systems convey information to humans. See Luke Swartz,
Overwhelmed by Technology: How Did User Interface on Board the USS Vincennes Lead to 290
Dead?, http://xenon.stanford.edu/-lswartz/vincennes.pdf (last visited Oct. 32, 2016).
330. SR Report, supra note 3, 141.

331. Id.¶ 42.
332. Id.
333. Id. This is essentially the same as Losing Humanity's version of autonomous, which requires
"open and unstructured environments." Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 12.
334. See SR Report, supra note 3, 1 42.

49

[Vol. 44: 1, 2016]

False Rubicons
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

targets and then launching or firing lethal force at those targets.335

The SR Report then takes a step Losing Humanity did not, and at least
references current weapons systems using terminology from the report. 336 It
is unclear which is worse, Losing Humanity not taking the step or the

manner by which the SR Report does so.3 37 The SR Report lists several
weapons systems, including the U.S. Phalanx and CRAM systems, Israel's

Harpy, the U.K.'s Taranis, and South Korea's Techwin security guard
robot.338 Yet with the exception of the Harpy, the SR Report labels the
systems "automatic." 339 According to the SR Report, these systems are akin
to household appliances, and the weapons systems operating environmentarmed conflict-is thus a structured and predictable environment, which

thus far has never been a descriptor of warfare.340
If the SR Report was correct that the systems are not autonomous, it
would mean that none of the systems, except Israel's, would be considered
LARs; and consequently, none would fall under the SR's called-for
moratorium.341 But, of course, it is not correct. All of the systems are
autonomous weapons.34 2 All are capable of selecting and engaging a target
without human intervention.3 43
And not surprisingly, the conceptual dissonance within both documents
leads to flawed proposals: calls for a ban or moratorium that do not nor

335. See id.¶ 45.
336. See id.
337. See generally Losing Humanity, supranote 8.
338. See SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 45.

339. Id.
340. But see ICRC REPORT, supra note 24, at 18 (describing how the British Ministry of Defence

distinguishes between automated and autonomous, stating that only weapons systems "capable of
understanding higher intent and direction" are autonomous). The British Military contends its
defensive weapons systems are automated. Id. This would seem to be an overall characterization
and not a characterization based on the function of engagement. While much of this article focuses
on The Campaign's motivations to label extant systems as something other than autonomous, this is

an example of a State doing the same thing. The result is a bizarre but appropriate reflection of the
current LAWS discussion. As discussed, the British Navy employs the Phalanx system and contends
it is automatic. See id. The ICRC and the manufacturer of the Phalanx refer to as it autonomous.
See id. To the United Kingdom's credit however, they and the United States are the only countries

to have developed and released national policies on autonomous weapons systems. See id.
341.
listing
342.
343.
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See id. The SR Report's rationale for labeling U.S. and Korean weapons "automatic" while
Israel's as autonomous is unclear. See SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 45.
See SR Report, supra note 3, 1 45.
See id.
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cannot specify the subject of the regulation they propose. 34 4
C.

Flawed Proposals

1. Losing Humanity's Call for a Ban
The report concludes with a series of recommendations. 345 The first and
most significant is that all countries should "[p]rohibit the development,
production, and use of fully autonomous weapons through an international
legally binding instrument." 346
States should preemptively ban fully autonomous weapons because
of the threat these kinds of robots would pose to civilians during
times of war. A prohibition would ensure that firing decisions are
made by humans, who possess the ability to interpret targets'
actions more accurately, have better capacity for judging complex
situations, and possess empathy that can lead to acts of mercy.
Preserving human involvement in the decision-making loop would
also make it easier to identify an individual to hold accountable for
any unlawful acts that occur from the use of a robotic weapon, thus
increasing deterrence and allowing for retribution.
This prohibition should apply to robotic weapons that can make the
choice to use lethal force without human input or supervision. It
should also apply to weapons with such limited human involvement
in targeting decisions that humans are effectively out of the loop.
For example, a human may not have enough time to override a
computer's decision to fire on a target, or a single human operator
may not be able to maintain adequate oversight of a swarm of
dozens of unmanned aircraft. Some on-the-loop weapons could
prove as dangerous to civilians as out-of-the-loop ones. Further
study will be required to determine where to draw the line between
acceptable and unacceptable autonomy for weaponized robots.34 7

344. See infra Section III.C.
345. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 46-47.

346. Id. at 46.
347. Id. at 46-47.
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The report provides minimal support for the claim that humans "possess

the ability to interpret targets' actions more accurately [and] have better
capacity for judging complex situations."348 Humans may indeed be better
than current machines at interpreting human intentions, given the role of
context and perception. 34 9 But that requires interactions involving visual
observation-seeing the person you are shooting at-which the

overwhelming majority of armed conflict does not involve.350
In terms of human versus machine in the ability to "judg[e] complex
situations," it depends on what "complex situation" means. 5
If the
complexity involves nuanced human emotions and nonverbal gestures and
cues, humans again are better equipped.3 52 But in circumstances far more

readily occurring in combat, machines collect and process far more
information more quickly and accurately than humans.353 Consider, for
example, the Phalanx, which identifies and assesses a range of variables
including threat aircraft or missile range, angle of attack, and velocity; and
does so in the rolling, open ocean.35 4

348. Id. at 46.
349. See generally Rob Sparrow, Twenty Seconds to Comply, 91 INT'L L. STUD. 699 (2015)
(describing challenges an autonomous weapons system would have in accepting surrender). But see
Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson, New Capabilitiesin Warfare: An Overview of Contemporary
Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36
Weapons Reviews, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS, no. 886, 2012, at 483 (discussing the tradeoffs
between autonomous weapons system sensitivity and specificity).
350. JONATHAN B. A. BAILEY, FIELD ARTILLERY AND FIREPOwER (2004) (reporting that during
WWII, artillery caused 51% of Soviet casualties, 60% of American casualties, 70% of German
casualties, and 75% of British casualties). The majority of service-member casualties during WWII
were caused by artillery, which is an indirect fire system. Id. The artillery crews loading and firing
can't see their target, which is usually miles away. Id. Projections of future warfare envision more

decentralization and less "seeing" the enemy, in a physical sensory manner, than in prior conflicts.
See generally STEVEN METz, ARMED CONFLICT IN THE

2 1sT

CENTURY: THE INFORMATION

REVOLUTION AND POST-MODERN WARFARE (2000), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/
metz info rev.pdf.
351. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 46.
352. See Sparrow, supra note 349, at 705 (describing how "perception-theability to form a
model of the world and to locate themselves within it based upon information from their sensors-

that robots struggled with and that has constituted the main obstacle to [robot's] use in more than a
handful of roles").
353. See, e.g., infra note 354 and accompanying text.
354. The Phalanx system consists of six major assemblies and components. See David Cela,
Correlation of Bullet Dispersion and Traverse Barrel Tip Displacement on a Firing Phalanx Gun
System, 1, 2, (Dec. 1994) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval Post Graduate School),
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a294604.pdf. The functions of just one of those six-the on-
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In the second half of the recommendation to States, Losing Humanity

claims the ban should extend to weapons with "such limited" human
involvement as to render us effectively out of the loop.355 Yet the report at
no point delineates the human control line.356

The recommendation provides that a "human operator may not be able
to maintain adequate oversight of a swarm of dozens of unmanned

aircraft."35 7 This example may sound futuristic but it's not.3 ' Nor is it
meaningfully different than the reality of the last thirty-plus years wherein
humans have supervised the conduct of any number of autonomous weapons
systems that simultaneously identify and track multiple targets.35 9
Losing Humanity nonetheless calls for current weapons systems, which

the report cannot specify, to be included in the ban.360 The recommendation
ends by claiming that further study is required to know "where to draw the
line." 36 ' Thus, Losing Humanity simultaneously proposes a ban and
proposes to determine the subject of the ban.362 In contrast, the SR Report
proposed a moratorium but still was no clearer than Losing Humanity on
how to identify which weapons systems would be included.3 63

mount fire control assembly-include:

"target search, detection and threat declaration, track

acquisition, target track and measurement of range, velocity and angle, target prediction, lead angle
computation, gun aiming and firing, projectile detection, measurement of projectile velocity and
angle and gun aim bias correction." Id. at 2-3.
355. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 46.
356. See generally Losing Humanity, supra note 8. Again, autonomy is not usefully thought of in
levels, nor in linear fashion. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
357. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 46-47.
358. See Kris Osborn, Air Force Developing Swarms of Mini-Drones, DEFENCETECH (May 27,
2015), http://www.defensetech.org/2015/05/27/air-force-developing-swarms-of-mini-drones/.
359. This is certainly not a claim that because humans already have supervised autonomous
weapons, that supervision was meaningful or advisable.
See Osborn, supra note 358 and
accompanying text. But the conversation on LAWS must include the fact that autonomous weapons
systems are already in use. Id. Critique any or all them, hopefully with a degree of specificity in the
critique; but ignoring them or trying to explain them away as something other than autonomous fails

to correctly state or scope the problem, undermining the resulting answer or solution in the process.
See Losing Humanity, supranote 8, at 46.
360. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 5.

361. Id. at 47.
362. Id. at 46.
363. See infra notes 364-72 and accompanying text.

53

False Rubicons

[Vol. 44: 1, 2016]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

2.

SR Report's Call for a Moratorium

The SR Report concludes by reinforcing but not supporting the moral
panic fostered throughout.3 64 The report claims that LAWS "could have farreaching effects on societal values, including fundamentally on the
protection and the value of life and on international stability and security,"
and "may denigrate the value of life itself."3 65 And while acknowledging
that it is foreseeable

that LAWS

could

comply with international

humanitarian law, two sentences later the SR Report refers to LAWS as
"[t]ireless war machines, ready for deployment at the push of a
9,366
button ....
Yet when the melodramatic language is stripped away, what remains is
a report that doesn't specify the weapons systems that should be subject to a

moratorium.3 67 Like Losing Humanity, the SR Report doesn't explain what
should be subject to a moratorium, which renders the call functionally
useless.36 8 Why the SR Report can't explain what should be banned reflects
the inherent flaw in attempting the ban.369

The SR Report recommends a moratorium on "at least the testing,
production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment and use of LARs
until the time an internationally agreed upon framework on the future of
LARs is established." 370 It's an oddly specific call given the ambiguity of
what it seeks to subject to a moratorium. 371

And this ambiguity, coupled

with the ambiguity of Losing Humanity, has not facilitated constructive
dialogue at CCW.372

364. See SR Report, supra note 3, IM 109-26.

365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. ¶ 109.
Id.
Id. TT 113-26.
Id.

369. See infra notes 370-72 and accompanying text.
370. SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 113.

371. Id.
372. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Crootof, supranote 42.
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IV. CCW
In a relatively short period of time, The Campaign and the groups it
represents have been extremely successful in prompting the States Parties to
the CCW to consider LAWS.3 73 One need only view the UN's LAWS
webpage to appreciate The Campaign's pride of place.3 74 The website
acknowledges that the issue of LAWS was "first brought to the international
community's attention by Human Rights Watch in its report titled 'Losing

Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots. "'37 In bold letters, the website
lists "The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots" and includes links to two videos
The Campaign produced: a "short film explaining the background to LAWS
and work being undertaken within the United Nations and civil society" 376
and one on The Campaign's "work during the 2015 Meeting of Experts on

LAWS."37 7

The latter video includes a message from the UN High

Representative for Disarmament Affairs, "acknowledg[ing] the critical role
... civil society, especially The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, has
played" in "driving international attention to this issue."378 Yet having

driven the CCW States Parties to consider LAWS, collectively those
countries are not anywhere close to adopting a CCW protocol banning

373. As an indirect indicator, when the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross's
Arms Unit spoke on LAWS, she singled out The Campaign and the UN Special Rapporteur for
playing "a very important role in highlighting the risks posed by the development of these weapons
and the need for the international community to pay urgent attention to this issue." See Kathleen
Lawand, Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems, ICRC (Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.icrc.org/
eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/09-03-autonomous-weapons.htm.
374. See Background, supra note 41.
375. Id.
376. Id.; see Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Convention on Conventional Weapons, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-tCGidyqwHWk&feature=youtu.be [hereinafter
YOUTUBE, Convention on Conventional Weapons].
377. Background, supra note 41; see also Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Second UN Meeting
on Killer Robots, YouTUBE (May 9, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-8xcq3btlYdg&
feature=youtu.be [hereinafter YOUTUBE, Second UN Meeting on Killer Robots]. While the CCW
website refers to the weapons systems at issue as LAWS, The Campaign videos continue to promote
and advance the term "killer robots" by using the term in the title imbedded in the video-one
YouTube title is the innocuous Convention on Conventional Weapons and the other YouTube title is
Second UN Meeting on Killer Robots (despite the CCW not using that term). See YOUTUBE,
Convention on Conventional Weapons, supra note 376; YOUTUBE, Second UN Meeting on Killer
Robots, supra.
378. See YOUTUBE, Convention on Conventional Weapons, supra note 376; YOUTUBE, Second
UN Meeting on Killer Robots, supranote 377.
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LAWS-the decisive action The Campaign calls for.379

One possible reason is that attempting to preemptively ban fully
autonomous weapons, which do not (and may not ever) exist, is arguably
unprecedented.3 80 Efforts to ban cluster munitions in 2008381 and landmines

in 1996382 were largely empirically based. Unlike with LAWS, there was no
need to speculate as to the harm those weapons caused.383 And while there

was a prospective element to the CCW Protocol on Blinding Lasers adopted
in 1995, military lasers capable of blinding humans were already in use.384
And of course different States have different interests and motivations
regarding whether to support a ban, oppose it, or defer a decision.3 85
International consensus is challenging in any area, but in framing LAWS in

"killer robots" terms, The Campaign essentially undermined itself-the price
paid for the successful marketing campaign has been obfuscation of the
issues.

379. See generally Background, supra note 41.
380. Charli Carpenter, Beware the Killer Robots,

FOREIGN

AFF.

(Jul.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-07-03/beware-killer-robots

3,

2013),

("This new

movement [to ban LAWS] is unique amongst disarmament campaigns since the organizations are
lobbying against a class of weapons that has not yet been widely deployed or shown to cause
massive humanitarian harm.. .. [F]ew weapons have been banned preemptively based on the harm
they might cause, precisely because it is difficult to make such a case on empirical grounds.").
381. See Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 259 (providing general and background
information).
382. See generally Anti-personnel Landmine Convention, UNITED NATIONS OFF. GENEVA,

http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/CA826818C8330D2BC1257180004B1B2E?O
penDocument (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
383. Given their nature, already existing and employed land mines, cluster munitions, and other

explosive remnants of war continue to maim and kill over 1,000 people a year. See Cluster Munition
&

Coalition, Casualtiesfrom Victim-Activated Improvised Explosive Devices in 2014, LANDMINE
CLUSTER MuNrION MONITOR (Nov. 30, 2015), http://the-monitor.org/media/2155552/
2015 IEDsBriefingPaper.pdf; see also Charli Carpenter, Beware the Killer Robots, FOREIGN AFF.
(Jul. 2 2013), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-07-03/beware-killer-robots

(explaining the link between the "humanitarian toll" from landmines and cluster munitions, and the
eventual bans of those weapons).
384. See Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of October 10, 1980, adopted Oct. 13, 1995,
T.I.A.S. No. 09-721.2 (entered into force July 21, 2009) [hereinafter Protocol IV].
385. See The Problem, supranote 9; see generallyReport of the 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts
on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UNITED NATIONS OFF. GENEVA (2014),

http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(%20httpAssets)/35OD9ABEDlAFA515C1257CF30047
A8C7/$file/ReportAdvancedVersionlOJune.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Meeting] (demonstrating the
different opinions held by the various delegations); Eveleth, supra note 32.
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Because of the inability to reconcile potential killer robots with long-

standing weapons systems capable of selecting and engaging targets without
further human intervention, The Campaign has had to couch the ban in
general terms.3 86

But this lack of specificity has (depending on one's

perspective) either allowed or set the conditions for the international
discussion to become circular, which is reflected in what has transpired at

CCW since the treaty body addressed LAWS in 2013.387
In 2014, the majority of the debate was spent discussing how to define
autonomy.
Not only was no definition reached, a majority of the
delegations thought it premature to even attempt one. 3 89 As discussed infra,
trying to precisely define autonomy does not seem possible. 3 9 0 And the

delegations further muddied the waters by suggesting that one indefinable
concept-autonomy-might be thought of in reference to an almost equally
indefinable concept-"meaningful human control." 39' The 2015 CCW
LAWS meeting chair described the resulting lack of consensus:
The term "meaningful human control" was raised frequently as a
possible notion to advance the understanding of the nature of
LAWS.

However, several delegations expressed scepticism over

the utility of "meaningful human control", assessing it as being too
vague, subjective and unclear. The term "human judgment" was
proposed as an alternative. Some delegations held that when
characterising LAWS, "autonomy" would be a more precise and
appropriate technical term.

Other delegations highlighted the

concept of "critical functions" as potentially helpful in identifying

386. See H.E. Michael Biontino, Meeting of the High ContractingParties to the Convention on
Prohibitionsor Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, ¶ 6 (Nov. 2015),
http://www.genf.diplo.de/contentblob/4665552/Daten/6038279/20151112berichtexpertlethal.pdf
[hereinafter 2015 Meeting].
387. 2014 Meeting, supra note 385.

388. See id.
389. Id. 1 17 ("The issue of a definition was raised by a number of delegations. While some
suggested that a clarification would be necessary at a certain stage if more substantial work were to
be undertaken, most of the delegations indicated that it was too early to engage in such a
negotiation.").

390. See infra Section V.A.1.
391. 2014 Meeting, supra note 385, ¶ 20 (reporting that "[miany interventions stressed that the
notion of meaningful human control could be useful to address the question of autonomy").
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defining elements of LAWS.392

This trend continued in a November 2015 CCW LAWS meeting where
delegates agreed to continue discussions without resolving any substantive
issues or even reaching consensus as what those issues were.3 9 3
In the lead-up to the April 2016 CCW meetings, The Campaign assessed
the decision to continue the LAWS discussion as "lack[ing] ambition,
show[ing] no sense of urgency, and reflect[ing] the CCW's usual 'go slow

and aim low' approach." 394 The April meeting 395 yielded a recommendation
that the CCW States Parties establish a group of governmental experts who
would meet in 2017 to "explore and agree on possible recommendations on
options," including a working definition of LAWS.3 96 Following the April
2016 meetings, The Campaign described the CCW process as proceeding,

"but at a lacklustre pace." 397

Thus far, eleven CCW States Parties have agreed to The Campaign's
call for a ban.39' The vast majority of countries are either undecided or do
not want to preemptively limit themselves in terms of weapons system

development. 399 For both of those groups-the undecided and the implicitly
opposed-continuing discussions is desirable.
Discussions may be
genuinely useful to the former. 400 To the latter category-first world nations

392. See generally 2015 Meeting, supra note 386.

393. Id. at 5 ("There was a general understanding that the debate needs to be further deepened.");
Report on Activities 2015, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS
(Apr. 2015)
http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/KRCCCWx2Ol5_Report_4June2015

uploaded.pdf.
394. More Talks in 2016 but Little Ambition, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS (Nov. 13,
2015), http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2015/11/noambition/ [hereinafter Little Ambition].
395. In the interest of full disclosure, the author participated in and presented at the April 2016

meetings.
396. CHAIRPERSON OF THE INFORMAL MEETING, ADVANCED VERSION: RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE 2016 REVIEw CONFERENCE 1 (2016), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/

6BB8A498BOA12AO3C1257FDBOO382863/$file/RecommendationsLAWS_2016_AdvancedVersi
on+(4+paras)+.pdf. Thus, in 2017, some three years after the CCW took up the issue of LAWS,
what LAWS are will yet again be a topic for international discussion. See id.
397. Ban Support Grows, supra note 39.
398. See Chronology, supranote 5. Among the fourteen States calling for ban, Egypt, Ghana and
Zimbabwe are not States Parties to the CCW. States Partiesand Signatories, UNITED NATIONS OFF.

GENEVA, http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/3CE7CFCOAA4A7548C12571COOO
39CBOC?OpenDocument (last updated June 21, 2016).
399. See generally SR Report, supra note 3.
400. See Report on Activities 2015, supra note 393 (noting that thirty-five countries expressed
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already employing LAWS-continued discussions are a way those countries

can monitor, influence, delay, and even prevent the process within the CCW
construct. 401 These countries have little interest in banning their own
weapons

systems,

so

CCW

discussions

ad infinitum are

perfectly

acceptable.402 Consider how receptive the United States delegation was (and
is) to the LAWS discussion within CCW:
We continue to believe that CCW, an IHL forum with its mix of
policy, military and technical experts, is the right venue to consider
this complex and important topic. This subject requires the in depth

discussions we have seen at our first two meetings of experts, and
we strongly support continuing these discussions next year. We
were pleased with the level of participation in the informal meeting
of experts but it is clear that this discussion is still in the early stages
and further work is required to help shape our understanding of this
future technology. 403

Despite this, or more accurately, because of this stalled state of affairs,
there is an opportunity to reframe the called for ban.404 And while
seemingly counterintuitive, this restructuring provides practical and strategic
advantages to both The Campaign and First World States Parties to CCW. 4 05

V. PROPOSAL
Calling for a preemptive ban of future weapons indistinguishable from

extant systems has not worked.406 I propose a moratorium, not of LAWS

their views on LAWS and their continued willingness to discuss the issue, including first-world
nations).
401. See generally id.
402. See generally Carpenter, supra note 380 (asserting that it is arguably unprecedented to fully
ban autonomous weapons).
403. Michael A. Meier, The Meeting of the High ContractingParties to the Convention on the
Prohibitionsor Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 2 (Nov. 12, 2015),

http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/FF19585DF8C9D410C1257FOF003B6702/$
file/usa.pdf.
404. See infra PartV.
405. See SR Report, supra note 3.
406. See 2015 Meeting, supranote 386, at 3.
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writ large, but of a subset, LAWS primarily designed to lethally target

personnel.40 7 The moratorium places the autonomy focus where it should be,
on the critical functions of targeted selection and engagement.40 8 How a
weapons

system

is

characterized

overall-automated,

automatic,

or

autonomous-does not seem nearly as significant as whether it is capable of
selecting and engaging targets without further human intervention.409

If a

weapon is so capable and it's primarily designed to lethally target personnel,
it is within the ambit of the proposed regulation. 410 This kind of a
moratorium has practical and strategic advantages. 4 1 1
A.

PracticalAdvantages of a Limited Moratorium

1.

Feasibility

The Campaign's current proposed ban would encompass some portion
of LAWS that over thirty countries have employed for thirty years.412 This
poses a staggering obstacle.4 13 And it has prompted largely unproductive
efforts by both The Campaign and States Parties to parse out automated and
automatic from autonomous, despite those delineations being unclear. 414
Yet the extant systems are almost all anti-material, and they target
munitions, aircraft, and ships-though as previously discussed, with indirect

but lethal outcomes to the human crews.415

Concern about killer robots

would seem to be about LAWS directly targeting humans with lethal
force.4 16

407. See Report on Activities 2016, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS (Apr.
2016),
http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/KRCCCWx2Ol6_Jun27upld-1.pdf.
408. See Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 1; see generally 2015 Meeting, supra note 386.
409. SR Report, supranote 3, at 1; see also 2015 Meeting, supra note 386, at 3 ("[S]ystems tasked

with making decisions on life and death without any human intervention, were they to be developed,
would be in breach of international humanitarian law (IHL), unethical and possible even pose a risk
to humanity itself.").
410. See generally SR Report, supra note 3.

411. See infra Section V.A-B.
412. See generally The Solution, supra note 7.
413. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
414. See supra Part I; see generally 2015 Meeting, supra note 386 ("Some delegations held that
when characterising LAWS, 'autonomy' would be a more precise and appropriate term.").
415. Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 7; 2015 Meeting, supra note 386.
416. See Christof Heyns, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights and Ethical IssuesTalking Points at Meeting of High ContractingParties to the Convention on Certain Conventional
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Seeking to ban LAWS writ large is overbroad, given the long-standing

use of anti-material LAWS.417 A moratorium on LAWS primarily designed
to target personnel would reach the gravamen of the concern of LAWS
killing people, while avoiding the challenges posed by attempting to ban
418

pre-existing systems.
The proposed moratorium would of course not resolve autonomy's

definitional problems, because they aren't solvable. 419 But it would remove
the current motivation to try to differentiate extant systems as automatic or
automated.42 0 Instead, the proposed moratorium would focus the inquiry on:
(1) whether the weapons system is primarily designed to target personnel
and (2) whether it is capable of selecting and engaging targets without

human intervention. 42 1 These questions help identify the weapons systems
seemingly at issue-those most likely to cause human injury or death, and
not because a human launched or fired the weapon.422 Yet the framing of the
current debate has generated efforts designed to preserve an intellectual
coherence to the called-for ban.423 This has unfortunately come at the
expense of losing or diluting the focus on weapons systems causing human
injury or death.424

The proposed moratorium offers advantages to both The Campaign and
CCW States Parties. With the current ban proposal on LAWS writ large, all
sides are incentivized to focus on a weapons systems' overall categorization

Weapons,

UNIED

NATIONS

OFF.

GENEVA

(Apr.

14,

2016),

http://www.unog.ch/

80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/205D5COB0545853BC1257F9BOO489FA3/$file/heyns+CCW+2
016+talking+points.pdf [hereinafter AWS]. At the 2016 CCW LAWS Experts Meeting, Christof
Heyns, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions and author
of the SR Report, suggested that the international community's focus be broader than lethal
autonomous weapons systems and proposed "AWS" for autonomous weapons systems. Id. For the
Special Rapporteur, AWS would allow for consideration of law enforcement use of non-lethal
systems. Id.
417. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
418. See discussion supraPart III.
419. See discussion supraPart IV.
420. See generally AWS, supra note 416; see also supraPartI.
421. See A WS, supra note 416, 1 3.
422. See id.; supra note 416.
423. See generally 2015 Meeting, supra note 386; Report on Activities 2016, supra note 407
(noting that ninety-four countries participated in the 2016 discussion on preserving an intellectual
coherence to the ban); supra Section III.C.
424. See supra Sections Im.C, Part IV and accompanying text.
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and for it to be something other than autonomous. 4 25

The overall

categorization borders on irrelevant 42 6-what matters is a weapons system's
capability to select and engage targets without human intervention.4 27 Thus,
if a State has an automatedweapons system that selects and engages humans
without human intervention, it would not be covered by a LAWS ban.428
This would be the outcome with even a sentry robot primarily designed to

target humans, as long as it is labeled automated. While that reflects the
current, albeit dysfunctional, state of affairs, to which constituency does this
superficial avoidance belong: constructive or progressive?
The proposed moratorium would only cover anti-personnel LAWS.429
This would likely include systems like South Korea'S 43 0 and Israel'S 43 1 sentry

425. See supra note 347 and accompanying text (emphasizing the ban on the entire category of
autonomous lethal weapons systems). The Campaign is incentivized because the alternative is that
extant systems long in controversial use by thirty countries and costing billions would be covered by
the ban, rendering the ban unfeasible. See supra Section II.B.C. And States Parties of course don't
want already developed weapons systems to be the subject of a ban. See id.

426. This is another way of referencing the autonomy delta between full autonomy and the
capability to select and engage targets without further human intervention. See supra notes 136-38
and accompanying text; see also supra Figure 1. As previously discussed, it seems impossible to
discuss the harm posed by that delta without crossing into science fiction. See supra notes 136-38
and accompanying text. Imagine two sentry-styled weapons systems. See supra Figures 2 & 3.

System A autonomously performs a number of functions, plugs itself in, loads ammunition, cleans
itself, and repairs itself. See supra Figure 1. But it is essentially a next generation Boomerang
system, meaning that while it detects and acquires targets, System A does not engage. See generally
supra note 164. System B is the opposite: humans plug it in, load, clean, and repair it. See supra

Figure 3. But System B detects, acquires, and engages targets. How is B not the focus of our
concern? Of the functions associated with System B, humans perform many of them. Thus, to the
extent we are compelled to label B, it is fair to say that overall it is something other than
autonomous. Yet this demonstrates the relative insignificance of this overall categorization and of
machine autonomy outside of critical functions like engaging.
427. See Crootof, supra note 42, at 1850 ("[D]istinctions between 'non-autonomous' and
'autonomous weapon systems ... are irrelevant when constructing a regulatory treaty's definitionusually because they fail to account for the level of human involvement in the decision to use lethal
force.").
428. See id. Presumably the authors of both Losing Humanity and the SR Report would point to
sections of their respective documents where they indicate that some forms and types of automatic
weapons would or should be covered by their proposed ban or moratorium. But as discussed, neither

report can differentiate which extant systems would fall under the regulation and why. See also
supra Part I And the lack of specificity in the reports is certainly not from a lack of effort or
concern. But at this point in time, if we can't provide answers as to how to classify thirty-year
weapons systems, we need to rethink and reword the questions.

429. See infra notes 430-35 and accompanying text.
430. Loz Blain, South Korea's Autonomous Robot Gun Turrets: Deadly from Kilometers Away,
NEW ATLAS (Dec. 7, 2004), http://newatlas.com/korea-dodamm-super-aegis-autonomos-robot-gun-
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robots and some that Russia432 and China43 are purportedly developing. 434

Those countries may continue to try to parse out the definition of autonomy,
but definitional intransigence from those four countries is far less an obstacle
than the status quo.435

Finally, the proposed moratorium could be agreed to much more quickly
than the LAWS discussions to date.436

And time does not appear on The

.

Campaign's side.437 Right now the CCW discussions to "explore . .
possible recommendations on options" are anticipated to occur in 2017 and
2018.438 Even if one of the recommendations, which would have to be
reached by consensus, was that a LAWS protocol to CCW be negotiated, it's
hard to envision that occurring before 2019 at the earliest.
As The

Campaign reiterated at the April 2016 meetings, its concern is on future
weapons systems. 43 9 But the longer the CCW discussions continue, the
greater the number of weapons that once were future concepts will be
developed into extant systems.44 0 Thus, systems developed in 2017, 2018,
and 2019 would not be covered by a protocol negotiated in 2019 that applies

turret/17198/ (previewing South Korea's plans for ground-based LAWS at the Demilitarized Zone

dividing North and South Korea).
431. Noah Schactman, Robo-Snipers, "Auto Kill Zones" to Protect Israeli Borders, WIRED (June
4, 2007), http://www.wired.com/2007/06/foryearsand_y/ (describing Israeli efforts, almost ten
years ago, to develop LAWS capable of performing ground sentry or security functions, including
employing lethal force).
432. See Patrick Tucker, The Pentagon is Nervous about Russian and Chinese Killer Robots,
DEFENSE ONE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/12/pentagon-nervousabout-russian-and-chinese-killer-robots/124465/?oref-d-dontmiss (describing U.S. concerns about

Russia potentially developing all robotic military units).
433. See Jeffrey Lin & P.W. Singer, China's New Trio of Urban Combat Robots, POPULAR Sci.
(Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.popsci.com/chinas-new-triple-team-fighting-robots (detailing China's
efforts to develop LAWS for ground, urban fighting).
434. See ICRC REPORT, supranote 24 ("[T]here are some existing anti-personnel weapon systems
that have autonomous modes, such as so called 'sentry weapons.').
435. See generally Background, supra note 41.
436. See supra notes 396-403 and accompanying text.

437. See supra notes 396-403 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
439. See 2016 Expert Meeting on Laws, Recommendations to the 2016 Review Conference
Submitted by the Chairpersonof the Informal Meeting of Experts, UNITED NATIONS OFF. GENEVA

(Apr. 2016), http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/37D51189AC4FB6E1C1257F4D
004CAFB2?OpenDocument.
440. See, e.g., Harriet Grant, UN Delay Could Open Door to Robot Wars, Say Experts, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/oct/06/autonomous-weapons-un-delayrobot-wars; supra notes 396-403 and accompanying text.
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to future systems.

2.

44 1

Consistent with CCW Regime

A primary purpose moratorium would also be consistent with other
CCW efforts to regulate weapons systems.4 42 For example, Protocol I to

CCW, which regulates non-detectable fragments, prohibits the "use [of] any
weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the
human body escape detection by X-rays."4 3 In similar fashion, Protocol III,
which regulates incendiary weapons, defines them as "any weapon or
munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn

injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof,
produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target."44
Thus, those protocols prohibit a subset of a broader category of weapons
based on their primary purpose. 44 5

To be clear, a moratorium on LAWS primarily designed to target
personnel does not mean that LAWS will not kill humans. 446 Anti-material
LAWs could, and as previously discussed, already have killed humans.44 7
For example, the pilots of aircraft were shot down by Patriot missile
batteries operating in an autonomous mode and South African soldiers were
killed by the malfunctioning anti-aircraft cannon. 448 And the same would
happen for navy-based LAWS targeting other ships-while the ship is the

441. Id.; see generally Chronology, supra note 5. The more that increasingly autonomous
weapons systems are fielded in the next couple of years and thus are not covered by a ban on
"future" systems, the greater the challenge will be to parse out and explain which LAWS would be
subject to regulation.
442. See infra notes 443-45 and accompanying text.
443. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I) to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of October 10, 1980, adopted Oct. 10, 1980,
19 I.L.M. 1529 [hereinafter Protocol I].

444. See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III)
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of October

10, 1980, adopted Oct. 10, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 09-721.1 (entered into force July 21, 2009)
[hereinafter Protocol III].
445.
446.
447.
448.

64
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target, the crews would be injured or killed.4 4 9 Assuming use consistent with

international humanitarian law, ground-based, anti-material LAWS would
not violate the proposed moratorium either.45 0
The proposed moratorium would allow the employment of LAWS

primarily designed to be anti-material but capable of being employed against
personnel.45 '

Indeed, this point as applied to CCW's Protocol III on

incendiary weapons is a source of considerable controversy. 45 2 Because
white phosphorous is primarily designed to generate billowing smoke to
obscure or signal, its use against personnel is not prohibited by Protocol
III.453 Yet while some would like to revise, and, in their view, strengthen
Protocol III, its adoption was nonetheless a positive step towards limiting the

harmful effects of armed conflict. 454 Thus, the proposed moratorium on
LAWS primarily designed to target personnel would also be an incomplete
and imperfect step, but a step nonetheless. In comparison to what little has
been accomplished thus far, a partial step seems progress indeed.

449. As previously discussed, there was an incident involving the system of one US warship firing
See supra notes 150-55 and
into another US warship, fortunately without serious injury.
accompanying text.

450. The ground-based system would either need to be capable of appropriate levels of distinction
or used under circumstances where it was only directed at belligerent material, such as trucks or
tanks. See Schmitt, supra note 43 (explaining the difference between weapons prohibited per se and
other weapons for which certain uses or employments are prohibited; thus, simply because a groundbased LAWS may not be capable of the requisite levels of distinction, its use is not necessarily

illegal).
451. See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
452. From Condemnation to Concrete Action: A Five-Year Review of Incendiary Weapons,
HuMAN RTS. WATCH (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/05/condemnationconcrete-action-five-year-review-incendiary-weapons [hereinafter From Condemnation to Concrete
Action] (proposing a plan by which to revise and in the view of HRW, improve CCW Protocol III).
453. W. Hays Parks, The Protocol on Incendiary Weapons, 279 INT'L REV. RED CRoss 535, 544
(1990); see also From Condemnation to ConcreteAction, supra note 452.
454. From Condemnationto ConcreteAction, supra note 452.
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B.

StrategicAdvantages of a Limited Moratorium

1.

Moratorium

The proposal is a moratorium, not a ban. 455 Given that it is unknown

how technology will or will not advance, a ban seems premature.4 5 6 And as
the international community has demonstrated, the finality of a ban, coupled
with the lack of empirical evidence of harm, has proven a tough sell.45 7
Moratoriums have the advantage of scalability, later becoming a ban or
alternatively, if technology mitigates the LAWS concerns, the moratorium
could be lifted.4 58

2.

Modify the Optics

The manner by which The Campaign has framed the issue has allowed
and possibly partially caused CCW States Parties to confusingly discuss the
issue, mostly talking past each other in the process.45 9 Currently, it is
perfectly reasonable for CCW States Parties to claim they are not sure what
is meant by LAWS, and that further discussion is needed.4 60 While the
proposed moratorium would not eliminate those challenges, its specificity

455. Another commentator, while approaching LAWS quite differently, argued that regulation,
not a ban, is more likely to reduce human suffering. See John Lewis, The Casefor RegulatingFully
Autonomous Weapons, 124 YALE L.J. 1309, 1310 (2015). To that end, Lewis looked to and drew
from the landmine convention. See id.
456. See Marco Sass6li, CCW Meeting ofExperts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (May
14, 2014) (unpublished powerpoint) (inquiring into what sorts of technological innovations will be

developed). And the ICRC has not joined the call to ban LAWS. See Lawand, supra note 373
(stating that the ICRC was not joining the call for a moratorium "at this time"). While that statement
was temporally qualified with "at this time," Ms. Lawand spoke over two years ago and the ICRC
has still not joined the call. See Autonomous Weapon Systems, INT'L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Nov.
12, 2014) ("The ICRC has not joined these calls for now.") (emphasis added). Perhaps that's
because, as one commentator noted, "[i]f there is one thing we can predict about technological
innovation, it is that it proceeds unpredictably. The potential for autonomous weapons is too
immense, and the implications for the future of warfare too important to be assumed away or to
remain unexplored." Michael S. Newton, Back to the Future: Reflections on the Advent on
Autonomous Weapons Systems, 5 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 5, 23 (2015).
457. See supra Section III.C.
458. See SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 111.
459. See Crootof, supra note 42, at 1841.
460. Cf Losing Humanity, supra note 8, at 12.
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and anti-personnel focus makes it harder for States Parties to claim

confusion, request more discussion, or avoid taking a position. 461 Few states
(other than the four previously discussed) will want to publicly oppose a
moratorium tailored to focus on LAWS primarily designed to target

people.46 2

And because

the moratorium would actually be about

autonomous systems for which the primary purpose is to target humans, The

Campaign could more legitimately employ the terms "killer robot." 463
3.

Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement

It is the First World CCW States Parties that won't but should welcome

this proposal for a variety of reasons. 4 64 As already discussed, the proposal
is a moratorium, not a ban.46 5 So the United States, United Kingdom, and
other countries can continue to develop and employ anti-material LAWS as
they have been.466 And agreeing to temporarily forego something they have

no intention of doing-developing LAWS primarily designed to target
personnel-is not a huge ask.467
The proposal also ensures that the LAWS discussion stays within CCW,
where States Parties can continue to participate and monitor. 468 Importantly,

for First World CCW States Parties, the proposed moratorium may represent
the best alternative to a negotiated agreement.46 9 While the majority of the
First World seems content to continue discussing LAWS but not more for

461. See supra Section V.A.
462. See Eveleth, supra note 32 ("[N]o government wants to be seen as pro-killer robot.").

463. See id.
464. See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text.
465. See supra note 455 and accompanying text.
466. See Schmitt, supra note 43, at 35 (concluding that developing autonomous weapons systems
is not unlawful "per se").
467. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA, no. 2, Mar. 1979, at 263-91 (describing prospect theory and the idea that
people don't miss what they never had).
468. Cf SR Report, supra note 3, ¶ 112.
469. WILLIAM L. URY & ROGER FISHER, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIvING IN 99-108 (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 3d ed. 2011) (introducing the concept of the
Best Alternative To The Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)-that one's attitude and approach
towards a negotiation should depend on the viability of alternatives to the negotiation).

Understanding the differing BATNAs in the LAWS context is important. Western First World
States Parties to the CCW should recognize the potential strength of The Campaign's BATNA in
circumventing CCW.
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the foreseeable future, The Campaign's patience is wearing thin.4 7 0 And The

Campaign's frustration was likely exacerbated by being excluded from a
portion of the November 2015 CCW LAWS meeting.47 1 While the First
World has a degree of control and influence within CCW, what if the

discussions shifted outside that process? 472 What countries like the United
States should worry about is that The Campaign may lobby a small number

of states outside the CCW process to meet and discuss LAWS. Assume
arguendo, the meetings take place not in Geneva and through CCW, but in
Mexico City,473 and the result of a series of meetings of like-minded
countries and NGOs is the Mexico Declaration or the Mexico Conventiona ban on LAWS more broadly. While that instrument would only be binding

on signatory states, as an international law fait accompli, it could gain
momentum through moral force and increased signatories.474 This is similar
to what happened with the Convention on Cluster Munitions-the result of

470. See Steven Gross, The U.S. Should Oppose the U.N.'s Attempt to Ban Autonomous Weapons,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/03/the-us-should-

oppose-the-uns-attempt-to-ban-autonomous-weapons.

On one level The Campaign's frustration is

misplaced. While NGOs and civil society play an important role, ultimately States, not NGOs,
determine international law. Id. But,
[a]lthough sovereign states have the final say at meetings of the CCW and in ad hoc
treaty negotiating forums, previous NGO campaigns-organized, funded and led by some

of the same NGOs seeking to ban LAWS-have played a significant role in efforts to ban
other "controversial" weapons.... Indeed, the current NGO campaign against LAWS is
modeled on the success of past campaigns conducted by the very same NGOs.

Id. And while obviously interested in CCW Protocol prohibiting LAWS, The Campaign has stated
that they "support any action to urgently address fully autonomous weapons in any forum. The
decision to begin work in the [CCW] does not prevent work elsewhere, such as the Human Rights
Council." Nations Agree, supra note 6.
471. Little Ambition, supra note 394 (describing how The Campaign's representatives "were told

to leave an informal consultation [at CCW] in 2016. This came after the United Kingdom objected
to their presence. No state supported the UK's request, but the chair asked [all] NGOs to leave.").
472. Shifting outside CCW includes the possibility of the LAWS discussion returning to the

Human Rights Council, which the Special Rapporteur may have suggested by implication when
proposing the term AWS and evaluating less than lethal autonomous systems used by police outside
of armed conflict. See A WS, supra note 416.
473. The key to this possible outcome would seem to be a couple of European States joining the
efforts, with northern European countries the most likely candidates.
474. Once such a process has concluded, the only question for the remaining States that did not
participate in the process is whether to sign or accede, because the opportunity to influence the
content of the text will have passed. States, like the United States and the United Kingdom, would

be in a difficult position, particularly if the "Mexico Convention" prohibited reservations,
understandings, and declarations through which States may otherwise influence a treaty, at least as
applied to them.
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the Oslo process, which the UN describes as "a diplomatic process that

includes States, civil society, the International Committee of the Red Cross
as well as the United Nations." 475
With each CCW LAWS meeting that determines only to hold another

meeting and continue discussions, the Western First World assumes a
strategic risk that The Campaign will leverage a similar "diplomatic

process" on LAWS outside the CCW process.47 6 From the perspective of
most CCW States Parties, to better ensure the ability to influence the LAWS
discussion, the conversation needs to remain in CCW. And a moratorium on
LAWS primarily designed to target personnel would facilitate just that.

CONCLUSION

Advances

in

autonomy

will,

indeed

already

are,

heralding

a

technological revolution.4 77 Driverless cars,47 8 the prospect of Amazon
delivering packages via largely autonomous aerial delivery systems, 479 and
endless other applications are now being used or developed.4 80

475. See generally Convention on Cluster Munitions, UNITED NATIONS OFF. GENEVA (May 30,

2008), http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/F27A2B84309EOC5AC12574F70036F
176?OpenDocument) (describing the "Oslo process").
476. See generally CCW Website, supranote 6.
477. See Peter Singer, The Robotics Revolution, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 11, 2012),
https://www.brookings.edulopinions/the-robotics-revolution/.
478. Daisuke Wakabayashi & Brian X. Chen, Apple is Said to Be Rethinking Strategy on SelfDriving Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/technology/apple-is-

said-to-be-rethinking-strategy-on-self-driving-cars.html (detailing that "automakers like Ford,
General Motors and Fiat Chrysler have all said they expect to put a number of self-driving vehicles
on the road in five years or less"). While revising this article in September 2016, the ride-sharing
company Uber conducted tests in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania involving largely autonomous vehicles
(and no driver). Cecilia Kang, No Driver? Bring It On-How Pittsburgh Became Uber's Testing

Ground, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/technology/no-driverbring-it-on-how-pittsburgh-became-ubers-testing-ground.html.
479. See Nicky Woolf & Samuel Gibbs, Amazon to Test Drone Delivery in Partnershipwith UK
Government, GUARDIAN (Jul. 25 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/25/
amazon-to-test-drone-delivery-uk-government.
480. To illustrate the seemingly endless possibilities flowing from increased autonomy, consider
that Australia may soon deploy the Cotusbot, a largely autonomous "killer robot," capable of
selecting and killing starfish (specifically the reef killing crown of thorns starfish). Michael Slezak,
Can This Starfish-Killing Robot Save the Great Barrier Reef?, NEW SCIENTIST (Jan. 13, 2016),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22930560-700-can-this-starfish-killing-robot-save-the-great
-barrier-reef/.
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There has never been a time in history where military and weapons

systems were wholesale excluded from society-altering technological
advances like those created by increases in autonomy. 48 1 And while a
wholesale ban is impossible because militaries have employed LAWS for

decades, that's the essence of The Campaign's proposed ban.482
The LAWS debate is proving a proxy for broader technology

483

and

4 84

morality questions.
And while those questions are fairly asked and
debated, in terms of the LAWS, the CCW discussions will not benefit nor
ever progress from yet another circular lap mired in attempts to define the
indefinable and framed by speculative future fears. 485 The international
community needs to exit the cul-de-sac into which The Campaign has so

quixotically compelled its entry. 48648There are manys ways to exit,487 and this
article attempts to offer one possibility. But the first and most important
step is to recognize the circular nature of the LAWS discussion to date.

481. See generally Sharkey, supra note 92.
482. See supra Part I.
483. Bryan Appleyard, The New Luddites: Why Former Digital Prophets Are Turning Against
Tech, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 5, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/119347/neo-luddisms-techskepticism.
484. See Autonomous Weapon Systems: Is it Morally Acceptablefor a Machine to Make Life and
Death Decisions?, supra note 134.
485. See generally supra Part III.
486. See supra note 52-55 and accompanying text.
487. Most certainly not referring to this article, but to the hope that after two years of informal
discussions CCW States Parties will remain open to other ways to approach the issue, U.S. Supreme

Court Justice Felix Frankfurter's advice that "[w]isdom too often never comes, and so one ought not
to reject it merely because it comes late," seems apt. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Tr.

Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

70

